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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO REFORM
In every American election there are two
acts of choice, Iavo periods of contest. The first
is the selection of the candidate of the party
hy the party; the other is the struggle between
the parties for the office. Frequently the former
of these is more important, more keenly fought
over than the latter.
James Bryce
"The American Commonweal th"
THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS
In the American political system, the selection of
the presidential nominees of the two major political parties
is indeed an important, hard fought and time consuming
battle, taking up more than twice as much time as the
general election campaign. There are various stages to this
fight, but none is as dramatic, or as important as the
parties’ national nominating conventions. In his book
The Rise and Growth of American Politics , Henry James Ford
compares them to an American and democratic substitute for
the coronation of a king. They are, it is true, a
significant part of the democratic ritualism present in
the American system. Together with the electronic spectacle
3of election night and the glitter and splendor of
inauguration day, they form the political pomp and
pageantry of the United States.
The convention system as it functions in the U.S.
is unique among national systems in choosing the head
of state. Its importance in the system cannot be overstated,
for it constitutes a watershed in the presidential selection
process. The convention is the culmination of one phase
of the political cycle and the inception of the next. In
the pre-convention stage the participants jockey for
position by employing various strategies calculated to
give them delegate strength. When the convention opens,
the relative strengths of the candidates have been
determined, and barring any obvious winner, the real
battle for the nomination then ensues.
Indigenous to America, the national conventions
have withstood the tests of tine, remaining functional
for over one-hundred and forty years. They originated
rather spontaneously and obscurely in the early 1830’s
during the 11Age of Jackson", and were a product of the
spirit of participatory democracy which was then sweeping
the country. When they first came upon the scene they
were one of the major innovations in the Republic’s
history, and were immediately acclaimed as a significant
reform of the party system. They soon removed the
nomination process from the small cabal of the Congressional
Caucus and opened it up to more widespread party
*1
participation. By doing so they served to end the
erosion of the separation of powers doctrine caused by
having presidential nominees chosen by members of the
legislative branch. Thus party conventions were the
response of the party system to grave inadequacies
apparent in the existent presidential selection system
and were hailed as a dynamic reform.
It is noteworthy that the legitimacy of conventions
has rarely been questioned by the public— even though
throughout their history they have had no legal status
whatever, and are not even mentioned in the Constitution.
It is also interesting to note the virility of conventions
in American politics. They have weathered the storms of
war, depression, secession, factionalism, third parties,
disastrous electoral defeat, and party collapse. As
new parties came into existence, they accepted the
convention system acknowledging it as an integral part of
the political process. Because of this, conventions have
remained stable nearly a century and a half, yet have
proven to have sufficient flexibility to adapt to almost
any development.
Conventions perform many functions in the political
system such as the nomination of the presidential ticket,
and the adoption of the formal party platform. They also
have an important party rally function, employing all
the speeches, demonstrations, and hoopla to arouse the
interest and enthusiasm of the delegates and direct it
.toward the goal of a united party— producing a victory
5over the common enemy, the opposition party. No
proposals have yet been offered for an alternative
system which would effectively replace all these functions
of the convention. The convention has achieved a
plateau of great importance, and barring the unlikely
adoption of a national primary in the near future,
will continue to be tiie prime vehicle for presidential
nominations and the body through which any concrete
reform of the process must come.
CRITICISM OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM
As previously mentioned, the entrance of conventions
onto the American political scene ushered in a wave of
reform in the dawning years of participatory democracy.
They were viewed by many as the genesis of a thorough
regeneration of the party system. Almost from the outset
however, the conventions began to lose their pristine
innocence. From the first national party conventions
held in 1831 down to the present, the system has been
subjected to almost constant attack. The specific focal
points against which the assaults have been directed have
varied, and corrective measures proposed have received
different emphases at different times, but in general
conventions have been almost constantly beset by a
barrage of criticism.
Let us now examine briefly a few of the major rebukes.
The first item of reproach is that conventions do not
6represent a clear picture of the party as a whole.
It has long been known that delegates to the national
conventions have been unrepresentative of the party with
regard to age, sex, race, and annual income. A majority
of the delegates are male, white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestants,
mainly white collar or professional people with an
annual income well above the national average. The
problem is not as grave in the Republican party, but the
Democratic party with its higher proportion of blacks,
Catholics, low income, and foreign stock is clearly out
of step in its delegate membership.^
Another complaint is that the convention does not
adequately represent the areas of party strength.
Through all their history, conventions have apportioned
delegates on the basis of electoral vote. Critics have
maintained that this gives a disproportionate degree of
power to small states and to states in which the party
organization is weak or almost nonexistent, while at the
same time ignoring the party’s bastions of strength.
Protests are lodged that this is tantamount to
representation on the basis of state sovereignty, and
ignores the equality of human voters.
Another point of conflict is tiie discontent
engendered by ttie fact that convention decisions are
ultimately determined by the relatively small number
of delegates who attend. Almost from the beginning
national conventions began evolving into more closed
groupings of party "professionals” to the exclusion of
7the party rank and file. Due to this development,
conventions have become epitomized, indeed immortalized,
in the stereotyped conception of the smoke-filled room.
At times the nominees have been the product of a
complicated web of high level bargaining conducted by a
group of convention power brokers. This usually occurred
during a deadlocked convention in which the increasing
hostilities of the stalemated factions threatened to
annihilate the party rally function, creating such a
feeling of ill will in the party and so sapping it of its
energy before the general election campaign, that the
opposition party would win the presidency. Compromise
candidates were in these situations annointed by the
convention "kingmakers" in the hopes of rescuing the
party from the shipwreck of disunity. Though this has
not occurred for decades, some state delegations arc
fctill "bossed" or held in an uncommitted status in
the hopes of a deadlock. The potential for such techniques
still arouse the ire of the reformers.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, also sparking
a feeling of resentment is tiie opinion that national
conventions have abdicated their deliberative functions.
The claim is often made that conventions today are
rather hollow affairs, nothing but mere rubber stamps,
meeting to ratify decisions which have already been made.
Open conventions have become increasingly rare, and quite
often the nomination is made on the first ballot. Latelv
8the front runners have been able to "sew up" the
nomination weeks, and in some instances, months ahead
of the convention's opening. It has been twenty years
since the convention of either party has found it necessary
to go beyond the first ballot in securing its standard
bearer, the Democrats taking three ballots to nominate
o
Adlai Stevenson in 1952, Platforms have become
generalizations of the party’s position on major issues,
the convention rarely taking the initiative to formulate
new stands. Major platform fights are increasingly rare,
the 1968 Democratic fight over Vietnam being somewhat of an
exception. In the face of these facts, it is small wonder
that some reformers charge the convention with being
little more than a sterile demonstration in party
fidelity carried out by the party hierarchy.
These are among the most common complaints levelled at
the conventions by their detractors. Discriminatory
selection of delegates, unrepresentative delegate
allocations, elitism, bossism, power brokerage,
predetermination of decisions, and loss of dynamic
functions have combined to strip away the convention’s
initial aura of reformism.
THE CALL FOR DEFORM
Although discontent lias plagued the conventions
almost constantly, it has flared to a high pitch only
sporadically. One of the most noteworthy and comprehensive
9criticisms of the convention system was made in a report
of the American Political Science Association in 1950.
It denounced conventions as being "unwieldy, unrepresentative,
and less than rerponsible . " The criticism focused on
the convention's allocation formula, its gargantuan size,
and its general inefficiency. Some measures advocated
were: drastically reducing the convention's size, the
holding of biennial conventions, and direct election of all
delegates by the rank and file to "encourage party unity
and give the convention a healthy grass roots flavor."^
Since then, disil lus ionment with conventions has
been on the rise, with the Democratic convention of 19 f>8
serving as a catalyst to the growing momentum for change.
The eyes of the nation were repelled by some of the sights
at Chicago: armed guards, electronic checkpoints, sentries,
barbed wire, maximum security— all were devices which
seemed alien to a supposedly open and democratic conclave.
Millions of television viewers saw the dissident New York
and California delegations, seated at the rear of the hall,
shouting for recognition but going unanswered. They saw
microphones suddenly go dead; they saw newsmen beaten on
the convention floor; they saw unabashedly pro-Humphrey
convention officers obeying hand signals from Mayor Daley;
they saw the regular and dissident factions shouting and
screaming at each other; they saw nights of pandemonium.
In short, they saw a party torn asunder. After the debacle
of 1968 the cry for reform became deafening.
10
The Republican party has so far successfully staved
off the momentum for change, since many of the ills
vhich plagued the Democrats in 1968 were absent from the
G.O.P. Being a more conservative and homogeneous grouping,
the Republicans have not been confronted with as vigorous
an impetus for change. The Democrats, a far more splintered,
dissentious, and faction-ridden conglomeration however, had
to be more receptive to the demands of the reformers and
after 1968 finally agreed to cooperate with them. This is
the topic with which this paper is concerned— the movement
within the Democratic party between the years 1968-1972
to reform its national convention.
It will be useful at this point to see why convention
reform is of such importance to the Democratic party.
To begin with, many have argued that delegations to
the national convention have been unrepresentative
of the rank and file. Also, the selection of delegates has
quite often been less than open and democratic. In some
states the power of delegate selection has been wielded
in a capricious manner by a mere handful of men. Blacks,
women, and young people have at times been systematically
excluded from this, the highest level of the party.
Within the past decade blacks have become more
important in elections due to the Voting Rights Act which
has increased their registration and election participat ion.
This has particularly worked to the advantage of the
Democrats, for in 1968 it has been estimated that over 85%
ii
of the black vote went to the Democratic nominee,
accounting for about 22% of the total Democratic vote.*1
Women too have become more politically active and
vociferous over the past years, demanding equality with
men in the political arena. Issues such as abortion and
birth control have served to interest more and more
women in political affairs. Representatives Shirley
Chisholm and Bella Abzug have become increasingly visible
in Democratic politics since 1%8. In the case of youth,
some eleven million between the ages of eighteen and
twenty have been enfranchised by the passage of the
twenty-sixth amendment. The Democratic reformers looked
to youth as a source of party strength, and party leaders
realized that a party without youth was a party without a
future. The Democrats came very close to having a youth
oriented fourth party on their hands in 19D8, and were
determined to avoid such a threat in 1972. They hoped that
their efforts would provide some concrete evidence that
the party was moving in the direction of a "New Politics",
and thus recapture some of the lost enthusiasm of youth
and convert it to the party's favor.
By reforming their convention, that old bulwark of
American politics, the Democratic reformers hoped to
present themselves, in contrast to the Republicans, as the
progressive, dynamic party of change and party of the
future. These reforms were meant to act as a sort of
re.juvenat ive for a party which had not been viewed too
differently from the Republican party. In 19^8
12
George Wallace got a lot of political mileage out of
telling people that there was not a dime’s worth of
difference between the two major parties. Democratic
convention reform was to be a first step in substantially
differentiating tweedle-dum from twcedle-dee.
THESIS OUTLINE
This study is primarily concerned with the
efforts of the Democratic party to reform its convention
by changing the method of delegate selection. An
old adage of American politics attributed to "Boss”
William Tweed, onetime head of New York’s Tammany machine,
states: "I don’t care who does the electing, so long as
I can do the nominating."^ It is the delegates who do
the nominating and who are, in effect, the convention.
Hence the convention’s determinations are shaped and
influenced by events occuring weeks, months, and
sometimes years before the bang of the opening gavel.
Because they in large part affect the eventual convention
outcome, the methods of delegate selection are at the
very heart of the reform program.
This chapter has served as a short introduction to
our topic, and I shall now briefly outline the succeeding
chapters. The second chapter will examine the delegate
selection processes as they functioned in the various
states, focusing on the methods employed in choosing the
participants of the 1968 convention. In this section I will
13
be looking at the inequities and abuses present in the
selection of delegates, citing examples of both the most
common and the most exceptional improprieties. The chapter
will next deal more specifically with the steps which were
taken to remedy this situation by tracing the growing
momentum for reform beginning with the 1968 convention,
looking at the studies, the maneuvers, the negotiations,
and the decisions which culminated in the establishment of
a study group charged with reforming the delegate selection
process. The organization, history, and workings of this
body in the years 1969-1970 will be examined in order to
ascertain how it went about its business, where it
obtained its information, and how it arrived at the
recommendations which it issued. Attention will then be
spotlighted on the individual reform proposals witli a
description and explanation of each, and how they aimed
to rectify the problems involved in delegate selection.
Having done that, the emphasis of tiie third chapter
will be centered on how the reform program was put into
action in the years 1970-1971. Included in this section
will be the reactions which the reform program elicited from
party members and leaders, including several prominent
presidential aspirants. The response of the party hierarchy
will then be demonstrated by a description of the struggle
between the pro- and anti-reform factions of the National
Committee over acceptance of the reform proposals. The
next hurdles in the way of implementation were t'\o court
14
suits aimed at overturning the Committee’s acceptance
of the reform proposals. Thus the legal arguments both
in favor of and against the reform plans will be examined
in further detail at this point, culminating in the
disposition of the cases. Finally will come the reactions
of the groups most vitally important to the success of the
reform effort: the states. This section will deal with
the reactions of the state party leaders, their opinions
of the reforms, and how they went about complying with
them. Every state can not be covered, but several
examples will be given to demonstrate the diverse
reactions and the various plans and levels of compliance.
The next chapter will deal with the workings of the
reforms once they were put into action, and will cover the
period of January through July, 1972. Its prime concern
vrill be to examine how the reforms were put into operation
in the states, and the results that they had on the
subsequent selection of delegates. It will then turn its
attention to the actions taken to enforce the reforms by
the Credentials Committee and the federal courts. This
will he followed by a study of the Credentials Committee’s
report to the convention, and the enforcement actions of
the entire convention membership.
The concluding chapter will concentrate on the results
of the reform effort and the effects that they have had
on the Democratic party. At the base of such an analysis
will be an inquiry into whether or not the reforms
accomplished their immediate objectives. Thus I will be
15
looking into what effects the reforms had on the
democratization of the convention, and to what degree
they were successful in abolishing the injustices which
existed before 1968. Tied in with this is the extent to
which they succeeded in bringing into the political
process groups that had previously been excluded. This
entails looking at the effects that the reforms had on
altering the composition of both the participants in the
selection process, and of the convention delegates
themselves. Included also will be praises and criticisms
of the reforms by politicians, authors, jpurnalists, and
other observers of the reform process, together with
their suggestions for future improvements. In summary,
this chapter will be aimed at looking at the reform
effort in the years 1968-1972, its merits and its debits,
and trying to arrive at some sort of balance sheet as
to its effectiveness and worth.
As a consequence of this analysis I hope to be
able to formulate some overall assessment of their impact
on the Democratic party and the party process in general.
Very little work seems to have been done on this most
intriguing subject, and a definitive work on the reform
effort is yet to be written. Donald Matthews, who in 1973
edited a series of papers on presidential nominations
entitled Perspective s on Presidential Selection ,
16
commented in the introduction that not one paper dealing
with the reform effort had been submitted.^ I feel that
an endeavor of such magnitude by so large and powerful
a political body as the Democratic party certainly
deserves to be investigated not only for the importance
it held for delegate selection to the 1972 Democratic
convention, but also for the precedent which it set
for the future, and hopefully for the Republican party
CHAPTER II
DEVELOPMENT OF REFORM
The Democratic National Convention of 1968
has already settled into the folklore of American
politics. Its mere mention evokes memories of
tumultuous floor debate, bloodshed and teargas in
the streets, delegates and demonstrators standing
arm in arm in coni' rontat ion with the police. To
some it also evokes the image of rigged procedures,
of a party assembled to reach predetermined
decisions. The convention became the shame of the
Democratic party and in all likelihood assured its
defeat in the November following. Wherever politicians
meet, wherever Americans meet, they agree that the
convention put such a strain on the democratic
system of government that a repetition would be
intolerable
.
Senator George McGovern
Harpers Magazine, January 1970
DELEGATE SELECTION IN 1968
It is quite true that mention of
convention evokes passionate feelings
for most Americans who observed it. I
the 1908 Chicago
and vivid memories
t was certainly one
of the most turbulent and divisive conventions in the
nation’s history. However, it was this same assembly
which issued the call for reform of delegate selection
procedures to insure tiiat the "intolerable" repetition
would be successfully avoided. In order to better
understand the need for altering the system of delegate
selection it will be useful to examine the procedures in
use at the time and view the points of controversy.
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As late as 1968 there were no concrete rules on
delegate selection put out by the National Committee or
any other body at the national level. In keeping with the
decentralized federal structure of American political
parties, delegate selection procedures were left to the
individual state parties. Considerable amounts of
discretion were given to them, and no two states chose
their delegates in the exact same manner, though there
were a few basic patterns or classifications into which
most states could be placed. Broadly speaking, there were
three methods by which to select national convention
delegates: the first was selection by party organizations
specially chosen for the task, usually state party
conventions; second, selection by existing party bodies,
generally the state committee; and lastly, selection by
the voters in a primary election. The methods used by
each state in 1968 can be seen in Table 1.
The most widely used method of delegate selection
was by ad hoc groups specially convened for the occasion.
As seen in Table 1, twenty-six states chose their entire
delegation by state conventions and three others chose
part of their delegations in this manner. There were numerous
variations to this system, but in most states the party
members caucused at their precinct, ward, or township
levels to elect delegates to either a county or a
congressional district convention. This intermediary body
then elected members to a state convention. In some smaller
20
TABLE 1*
Delegate Selection Systems in 1968
Convention Systems Committee Systems Primary Systems
Alas
.
Colo.
Conn.
Del.
Haw.
Ida.
Iowa
Kans
Ky.
Me.
Minn.
Miss.
Mich.
Mo. Ar i 7
. Ala
.
Mont
.
Ark. Cal.
Nov. Geo
.
D.C.
N.M. La
.
Fla.
N.C. Md. Mass
,
N.D. ft. I
. Neb
s.c. N.H.
Tenn N
.
J
.
Tex. Ohio
Utah Ore
Va. S.D.
vt. W, Va.
.
Wyo.
Mixed Systems
111.- two-thirds by
convention and one-
third by primary.
Ind.- all chosen by
state convention but
bound to winner of
the separate
preference poll.
N.Y.- one-third by
committee and two-
thirds by primary.
Okla.- one-half by
convention and one
half by committee.
Penn.- one-fourth by
committee and three-
fourths by primary.
Wash.- two-thirds by
convention and one-
third by committee.
Wise.- appointed by
state committee and
winner of the
preference poll.
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection,
Mandate for Reform
,
(Washington D.C.: Democratic
National Committee, 1970), p.18.
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states, the local caucuses directly elected the state
convention delegates. In a few states, most of the national
delegates were elected at the congressional district
level. "The majority of state conventions allow for a
wide degree of popular participation. Party members are
invited to attend their local precinct meetings to nominate
and elect delegates to the next highest convention. In
several states including Colorado, Utah, Kentucky, and
Texas, a higher percentage of Democrats participated in
the selection process in 1968 than in some primary states." 1
Other states, however, allowed for less participation
by the rank and file; this occured when the conventions
were composed of party officials such as ward and precinct
chairmen, county chairmen, party committeemen, and state
legislators. Conventions of this type were generally more
closed to any input from party members and reeked of
bossism, thus unfairly bringing the mistrust of some
reformers upon all convention type selection procedures.
The next method of delegate selection was appointment
by an existing party body, most often the state committee.
This method was universally looked upon as the most
exclusive of meaningful rank and file participation, and
the most inherently undemocratic. Even though it accounted
for only a small number of the convention’s delegates,
(see Table 2), it received the full fury of the
reformers’ wrath. In some states the exclusiveness was
carried to extremes. In Louisiana for example, the delegates
were appointed by the governor, the state chairman, and
22
TADLE 2
*
Delegate Selection in 1968
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
46.4%
40.7%
1227
1068
Convention Primary
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate
Mandate for Reform , (Washington D.C.:
Na t i o n a 1 Comm i 1 1 e e , 1970), p.22.
12
. 9%
327
Committee
Selection,
Democratic
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the two national committeemen; in Georgia by the state
chairman with the advice and consent of the governor.
Thus the committee system was undoubtedly vulnerable to
the charge of bossism and elitism, for clearly delegate
selection was put in the hands of a small clique accountable
to no one for its actions.
Selecting delegates by statewide primary election
was the most recently devised method, being a product of
the early twentieth century's wave of progressivism and
making its debut around 1904. There were countless
variations among the different primary schemes and
sundry methods of categorizing them. Some primaries
such as Oregon's were mandatory for all recognized
candidates, and provided that delegates could run pledged
to a candidate without obtaining his consent.
The experience in these states indicates
that when would be delegates can freely identify
their candidate preferences on the ballot,
popular preferences can usually be given
effective expression. .. The voters have usually
been offered a meaningful choice. The resulting
mandates have been expressive, affirmative, and
specific, and have been executed at the convention
almost without exception.
2
However not all primaries were so effective in expressing
voter preferences, for those in New York and Pennsylvania
expressly forbade delegates to declare a presidential
preference on the ballot, the result being that voters
elected delegates not knowing to whom they were committed.
This does not mean that these delegates
arrive at the convention with no mandate.
2k
They mainly derive their mandates from the
party organizations or factional connections
which in some cases means that they arrive at
the convention firmly committed to a candidate,
while in others, they are occupying a position
of noncommitment. In general, these delegates
have the same kind of implied mandate that is
normally attached to an elected representative
who has won without making binding commitments
to his constituents, but who owes his election
to a political party or faction.
3
At the opposite extremes were the primaries of
states such as Ohio in which delegates were prohibited
from running on a no preference basis; they had to
secure the consent of a candidate and run pledged to
him. In such states it was customary for slates
which would otherwise run on. a no preference basis to
run under the name of a favorite son candidate or a
stand in. These slates were frequently elected. Through
this method sizeable blocs of delegates were often kept
from the serious presidential contenders.
Serious candidates who might enter a
state have on the whole been even more
reluctant to challenge a favorite son slate
than an organization sponsored no preference
slate. A paradoxical result has thus been
achieved. Where the law requires the would
be delegate to find a candidate who will
enter his name, it is particularly hard
to persuade any genuine candidate of national
importance to enter the race .
^
Yet another variant was the
Dakota and New Jersey which also
system found in South
required delegates to
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obtain the consent of a candidate to run under his
name, but which also allowed no preference, slates. In
these cases the no preference slates were quite often
elected "if the state party organization wants to send
an uncommitted delegation with freedom to maneuver; if
dissident factions see little reason to expect success with
entering an opposing slate; and if out of state candidates
prefer to avoid challenging the organization slate.
Therefore just by glancing at this summary of some
of the various primary systems in effect in 1968, it
should be apparent that they were not necessarily the most
open and democratic means of selecting delegates. Some
reformers have blindly called out for more primaries as
a panacea to the problem
,
but it should be kept in mind
that primaries, as well as committees and conventions,
can be manipulated to mask voter preferences and can
easily hide complexities which work to the detriment of
fair delegate selection. The primary states therefore
have also come under the watchful eye of the reformers,
and also have been subjected to criticism.
The selection procedures described above hav«- spawned
the abuses and inequities which were at the root of the
reformers complaints. The first of the several areas of
discontent which the reformers hoped to cure was that of
the procedural irregularities endemic to the existing
systems. Many of these were due to the great amount of
flexibility and discretionary powers given to the state
parties in ro ard to delegate selection. Never highly
26
centralized, American parties have always granted a great
deal of autonomy to state organizations, and have seldom
sought to regulate or supervise their internal matters.
Thus when the reform panel began its work in 1969, it found
that no written party rules whatever existed in ten states
and that rules in several other states did not describe
delegate selection processes in any detail. In other
states in which rules did exist, they were found to
be inaccessible to the rank and file party members
despite repeated attempts to secure them. This made
for a total of about twenty states in which party
rules were nonexistent or unavailable to interested
Democrats seeking to take part in delegate selection.
The absence, inadequacy, or inaccessibility of written
party rules explains what the Reform Commission found to
be the most common area of abuse
—
procedural
irregularity.
^
A necessary precondition for a full and meaningful
opportunity to participate in delegate selection is
information concerning the process. In 1968 many state
parties provided citizens with very little or no information
that the selection of delegates was taking place, the result
being that many state convention delegates were elected at
secret precinct caucuses controlled by the local party
apparatus. Other instances found information supplied at
the last minute so as to exclude many people from
27
participation. In other situations the rank and file were
given the opportunity to participate, but were not given
the opportunity for an informed choice; hence voters
who cast ballots in several primaries were given no
indication as to the delegate's presidential preference.
Many states had no party rules governing choice of dates
or times for party meetings involved in delegate selection;
discretionary powers were given to party officials who
called caucuses at inconvenient times and places, often
unannounced and calculated to discourage maximum
participation.
Several states also had no quorum provisions governing
party meetings. In these and in instances in which
quorum requirements existed but were very lenient, party
bodies were allowed to reach decisions concerning delegate
selection with only a small number of people present.
Quorum provisions in some states were as low as 15% or
20%, thus again leading to quite justified accusations of
bossism. Another related irregularity was the casting of
proxy votes by party officials, designed to augment their
control over the proceedings by overcoming any substantial
showing by dissident elements.
In many states the unit rule was used extensively
at party meetings to smother dissent and establish a
facade of unanimity. Under the unit rule all of a unit's
members were bound to the position, or the candidate, favored
by a majority. This was prevalent not only in convention
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or committee systems, but in winne
such as those found in Massachuset
which delegates were bound to the
vote regardless of the delegate’s
expressed on the ballot.
r take all primaries
ts and Oregon in
winner of the preference
personal choice as
The final selection of delegates was often made
or influenced by those who named or nominated the delegate
slates, for slates presented to the official decision
making body, be it voters, convention, or committee,
could be altered or opposed only with great difficulty.
Slatemaking was a crucial step in delegate selection, and
effective citizen participation was often precluded
through closed processes which made participation
difficult, which gave the organization slate preferential
status on the ballot, or which made an effective challenge
almost impossible.
The following is only one example of bow these
numerous procedural irregularities can combine to hamper
and restrict popular participation. It is the story of
delegate selection in a Missouri county in 1968:
In one county the chairmen of four
township conventions refused to disclose, despite
repeated questioning from the press, where the
meetings were being held. In another, the chairman
refused to disclose the place of the meeting until
the afternoon of the preceding day. The McCarthy
supporters, told to assemble at a local night spot,
arrived to he informed hy the brirtender that t lie
meeting had been moved to a place unknown to him.
In another instance, McCarthy supporters ere
notified of a convention forty minutes before it
was scheduled to meet; when they arrived it had
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already concluded its business. In one township
a test vote showed that McCarthy supporters
outnumbered party regulars by a margin of
140 to 111. One of the regulars then stood up
and voted 492 proxies for the regular Democratic
organization. Though the McCarthy people asked
to see the proxies, they were not allowed to.
In several precincts the required meetings
were never held. The chairmen merely
forwarded a list of "approved" delegates to
the next level in the nominating process. On
a number of occasions, McCarthy supporters did
manage to get themselves elected, but in each
case imposition of the unit rule effectively
nullified their influence. As a result, the
impact of the McCarthy candidacy on both
the district caucuses and the state convention
was negligible.
7
Obviously, to allow such practices as these to
continue to exist in our presidential selection
process would have been a travesty of democratic
principles.
The second area in which the existing delegate
selection procedures had noticeably failed was in
equal and adequate representation of the party’s
minority groups. Only 5.5% of the 1968 convention
delegates were black although blacks comprised over
11% of the nation's population and over 20% of the
Democratic vote. Fifteen states had no blacks in their
1968 delegations and another eleven had only one;
thirty states underrepresented the percentage of
blacks in their population, (see Table 3 )
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TABLE 3
*
Proportion of black delegates at 1968 convention as compared
to proportion of black population by states in 1968
Percent
of Black
Delegates
Percent
of Blacks
in State
Percent
of Black
Delegates
Percent
of Blacks
in State
Ala. k 30 Neb. 0 2
Alas
. 0 3 Nev. 7 5
Ariz. 3 3 N.H. 0 0
Ark
, 2 22 N. J. 9 9
Cal. 5 6 N.M
.
0 2
Colo. 8 2 N.Y. 6 8
Conn. 7 N.C. 6 25
Del. 5 lk N.D. 0 0
Fla. 7 18 Ohio 3 8
Geo
.
26 29 Okla. 9 7
Daw. 0 1 Ore 0 1
Ida. 0 0 Penn, 5 8
111. 6 10 R.I. 3 2
Ind 8 6 s.c. 13 35
Iowa 2 1 S.D. 0 0
Kans
.
3 k Tenn. 11 17
Ky. 8 7 Tex. k 12
La
.
18 32 Utah 0 1
Me. 0 0 vt. 0 0
Md. 6 17 Va. 6 21
Mass 3 2 Wash. 0 2
Mich. 20 9 W. Va. 2 5
Minn. 5 1 Wise
.
0 2
Miss 50 k2 Wyo. 0 1
Mo. k 9 D.C. 67 5k
Mont 0 0
*
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection,
Mandate for Reform (Washington D.C.: Democratic National
Committee^ 1 97 0 ) , j> . 2 7 -
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Since the 1968 election and the subsequent passage
of the twenty—sixth amendment lowering the voting age
from twenty one to eighteen, youth has become increasingly
interested in politics. The parties up until that ,oint
had largely ignored young people, who constituted only
a miniscule part of national convention delegates.
(see Table ^i) But now that their political stock had risen,
the parties began to vie for their support, mainly
through voter registration drives. The reform program was
viewed by some as another weapon in the Democratic arsenal
with which to capture the allegiance of young people.
Along the same lines as youth, women also increased
their political awareness and activism in the years
following the 1968 Democratic convention. Although women
comprised a majority of the voting age population, their
attendance at party conventions was always dramatically low.
As Table k shows, only 13$ of the 1968 Democratic delegates
were women. In no state were women given a number of
delegates commensurate with their numbers in the population.
Ten states had insufficient women to fill the positions
traditionally given to them on the four standing
committees, and only one delegation of the fifty-five had
a female chairman.
Thus as late as 1968 blacks, young people, and women
found that delegate positions at the Democratic national
convention were among the political offices which to a
large degree still eluded their grasp. The reformers hoped
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TABLE 4
*
Representation of Young People and Women at the 1968
Democratic Convention by States
*
Percent
Under
30
Percent
of
Women
Percent
Under
30
Percent
of
Women
Ala. 8 14 Neb
.
20 23
Alas
.
5 5 Nev. 10 17
Ariz. 0 21 N.H. 8 12
Ark. 2 22 N.J. 0 12
Cal. 5 14 N.M. 6 12
Colo. 0 14 N.Y. 1 9
Conn. 0 16 N.C. 1 10
Del. 0 9 N.D. 4 28
Fla. 5 44 Ohio 0 6
Geo. 9 19 Okla. 5 21
Haw. 8 Ore 9 23
Ida. 0 15 Penn. 5 11
111. 1 9 R.I. 0 12
Ind
.
0 6 s.c. 0
. 5
I ova 4 17 S.D. 4 23
Kans * 0 24 Tcnn. 0 9
Ky. 3 20 Tex. 1 12
La. 4 10 Utah 0 23
Me. 3 13 vt. 5 18
Md. 0 8 Va. 2 11
Mass i 12 Wash
.
7 14
Mich 1 19 W. Va. 11 5
Minn. 3 18 Wise 3 19
Miss. 7 7 Wyo. 0 18
Mo. 1 15 D.C. 9 35
Mont 3 25
*
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection,
Mandate for Reform (Washington D.C.: Democratic National
Commi t tee
,
1 97 0 ) , o . 28
.
33
by their actions to correct this situation in time
for the 1972 national convention and by doing so,
gather together many of these previously immobilized
resources
.
A third area of complaint in the existing selection
systems was the structural inadequacies which limited
access to the process. Chief among these was the timing
of delegate selection. Untimely selection was a familiar
lament of reform advocates, for many delegates were
selected before the candidates and the issues of the
campaign had crystallized. By the calendar year of the
convention, the machinery of delegate selection was
already in motion in several states and numerous party
officials empowered to appoint delegates, chiefly
party committees, had already been elected, (see Table 5 )
In 1968
,
states in which the delegate
selection process began before the calendar
year of the convention accounted for 860
votes at the convention. This represents
33$ of the votes cast. When the 110 votes
cast by members of the National Committee
(themselves elected in 196d) are added to
this total, the percentage of votes cast by
delegates elected in an untimely manner
rises to (970 votes)8
Because of these procedures, the day that Eugene
McCarthy announced his candidacy nearly one-third of the
delegates were in the process of being selected; and by
the time Lyndon Johnson withdrew from the presidential
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TADLE 5
*
Untimely Delegate Selection in 1968
In the following states all or some of the conventiondelegates were selected in a process beginning beforethe convention’s calendar year;
State Percent State Percent State Percen
Ariz
.
100 N.J. 100 Wash. 56
Ark. 100 R.I. 100 Okla, 53
Fla. 100 Wyo. 100 Geo
.
50
Ida. 100 N.D. 91 111. 50
Kans 100 Mass
.
66 Conn. 48
La. 100 Del. 65
.
I owa 43
Md. 100 Tenn 6k Va. 42
Mich 100 Ohio 58 Penn. 25
sweepstakes, formal delegate selection procedures were
underway in all but twelve states. Another inequity
concerned "ex officio" delegates. Many states designated
public or party officials (usually not chosen in the
calendar year of the convention) as automatic delegates
by virtue of their office, either to meetings leading to
delegate selection or to the national convention itself.
Apart from being an undemocratic procedure, such a
tactic also reduced the number of delegate positions
available to be filled by elected rank and file members.
*
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection,
Mandate for Reform
,
(Washington D.C.: Democratic
National Commit Lee, 1970), p.29.
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TABLE 6*
Personal Assumption of Delegate Campaign Costs and AverageExpenses of Democratic Convention Delegates in 1964
? L • ' , ' ;
*
Region
Personally
Assumed
Campaign Costs
Average
Expense
Northeast 78.8%
Midwest 75 . 3%
South 50 . 8% $'*53
West 78.7% $634
NATIONAL 12
.
0% $<i55
Other structural defects limiting access were the fees,
assessments, and other financial costs levied on the
would-be delegates. Some primary states charged excessive
filing fees for persons seeking delegate positions, and
often slates which had the party endorsement were given
preferential treatment on the ballot with regard to both
filing fees and position. In 1968 the official Connecticut
state party slate received free access to the ballot and
special designation. Challengers would have had to pay a
total of $14,000 to mount a statewide challenge. Delegates
at the convention were also often subjected to mandatory
assessments by their state parties, which in some cases
were in excess of $100. Personal expenses incurred by
the delegates at the convention site were estimated to
Kevin McKeough and John Bibby, The Costs of Political
Participation: a Study of National Convention Delegates
'(Princeton N.J.: Citizens Research Foundation, 1966), p. 91.
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have run about $455 and were paid by 91% of the delegates
out of their own pockets, (see Table 6) These financial
burdens obviously had the effect of limiting the
participation of the financially underprivileged and threaten
to turn our conventions into upper-middle-class clubs,
with the median annual income of delegates to the 1964
convention already being in excess of $20,000.
Apportionment was another structural deficiency
in the system. Allocation of delegates to the national
or state conventions was often based on rnalapport i oned
territorial units such as precincts, wards, towns, cities,
counties, and state legislative or congressional districts,
with little regard given to either population or Democratic
voting strength. This substantially distorted the voice
of the Democratic rank and file in the state.
These, then, were the major inadequacies, abuses,
and injustices which emanated from the system of delegate
selection as practiced in 1968. Attention will now turn
to the reformers efforts, and how they intended to go
about eliminating these deficiencies and replacing them
with more open and democratic procedures.
HISTORY OF THE REFORM COMMISSION
The first steps in the long and arduous process
of reforming delegate selection procedures were taken
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in the midsummer of 1968 by Governor (later Senator)
Harold Hughes of Iowa. Acting on his own initiative,
and spurred by his own devotion to reform, he organized
an ad hoc Commission on the Democratic Selection of
Democratic Candidates. This body investigated delegate
selection in all fifty states and unearthed many of the
abuses cited above. In its report to the National
Convention the Commission concluded that:
State systems for selecting delegates
to the National Convention and the procedures
of the Convention itself, display considerably
less fidelity to basic democratic principles
than a nation which claims to govern itself
democratically can safely tolerate. 10
Governor Hughes testified before the National
Convention’s Committee on Rules on August 22 and
called for sweeping changes in the methods of selecting
convention delegates. These included recommendations
for the complete abolition of the detested unit rule,
elimination of sexual and racial discrimination,
full access of rank and file members to the selection
procedures, fair apportionment, timely selection,
and adequate measures for representing minority
preferences. On August 23 the Rules Committee, chaired by
Governor Sam Shapiro of Illinois, proposed establishing
a commission to "give serious consideration to certain
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reforms." This was hardly an iron clad commitment to reform.
The Credentials Committee, concerned with delegate
certification, and to whom Hughes also appealed,
went a sten further on August 26 bv proposing that a
reform commission be charged with aiding state parties
in developing reforms and report its efforts and findings
to the 1972 convention for approval. A minority of the
Rules Committee under Governor Hughes then brought
the floor a still more vigorous resolution proposi
the 1972 convention "shall require" the reforms to
carried out. On August 27 the minority report was
by a vote of 1,350-1,206; Hughes had succeeded; a
11for reform had been issued. With this vote the
Democratic party embarked on a course which would
some of the most fundamental changes in the party'
long history. The minority resolution stated:
to
ng that
be
carried
mandate
produce
s
Be it resolved that the Call to the 1972
Convention shall contain the following language:
It is understood that a state Democratic
party in selecting and certifying delegates
to the National Convention, thereby undertakes
a process in which all Democratic voters shall
have full and timely opportunity to participate.
The Convention shall require that: (l) The unit
rule will not be used at any stage of the delegate
selection process, and (2) All feasible efforts
have been made to assure that delegates are
selected through party primary, convention,
or committee systems open to public participation
within the calendar year of the convention. 12
39
For quite some time after the convention adjourned
no action was taken, and the reformers’ murniers of
discontent began to grow into ominous grumblings.
Donald Peterson and Paul Schrade, co-chairmen of the
New Democratic Coalition, stated that if reform was not
carried out they were "prepared to make the 1968 convention
look like a picnic." National Committee Chairman
Lawrence O'Brien was attacked for his tardiness in
getting reform procedures off the ground, and on
January 14, 1969 he was succeeded by Senator Fred Harris
of Oklahoma who likewise was pressured to initiate the
promised reforms.
In February Harris set about naming the Reform
Commission. Senator Hughes actively sought the chairmanship
of the body, stressing his knowledge and experience
in the field; however, he was vetoed by former Vice-
President Hubert Humphrey because of his work for the
candidacies of Senators Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy
and because of his failure to campaign for Humphrey in the
fall. Instead, when the new Commission on Party Structure
and Delegate Selection was named on February 8, it was
under the leadership of Senator George McGovern of South
Dakota. Hughes was included as a member, and was named
Vice-Chairman by McGovern. Some observers pessimistically
viewed this as tokenism and voiced dire predictions
of failure, questioning whether the Commission was set
up only as a sop to the liberal reform element.
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Others were noticeably more optimistic, seeing a chance
to develop some important reform measures. Though Hughes,
the reformers’ favorite did not head it, the reformers
were heavily represented and Harris, a reformer himself,
was warmly praised for his appointments, (see Table 7)
On March 1st the Commission held its first meeting
in Washington D.C. This was to be one of the rare meetings
of the full Commission, since most of the work was done
by subgroups of five or six members. Not all members of
the Commission were committed to change, and some looked
upon their task with something less than fervor. The
representative of organized labor, Steelworker's President
I. W. Abel, was convinced that the Commission's work was
meaningless and did not attend a single meeting. Others
however were more hopeful and open-minded, and were the
true architects of the reform program.
At the first meeting, the Commission launched its
extensive investigation of delegate selection procedures
in the fifty states and sought to interpret the mandate's
rather ambiguous phrase "all feasible efforts". Since
legislative action vv-as needed in some cases and some
twenty state legislatures were controlled by Republicans,
and since some old line Democrats might look adversely on
reform, the following position was adopted: exception to
compliance would be tolerated in cases where Ptepublican
controlled legislatures blocked reform legislation, but
only if sufficient proof were given that the state party
41
*
TABLE 7
The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection
Chairman
George McGovern- U.S. Senator from South Dakota
Vice-Chairman
Harold Hughes- U.S. Senator from Iowa
I.V. Abel, President,
United Steelworkers
Birch Bayh, U.S. Senator
from Indiana
Samuel Beer, Professor of
Government, Harvard
Bert Bennett, former
chairman, N.C. Democratic
State Committee
Warren Christopher, former
U.S. Deputy Attorney-
General
Leroy Collins, former
Governor of Florida
Will Davis, former chairman,
Texas Democratic State
Committee
William Dodds, Director,
Community Action Dept.,
United Auto Workers
Frederick Dutton, former
Special Assistant to
President Kennedy
John English, National
Committeeman from N.Y.
Donald Fraser, U.S.
Congressman from Minn.
Peter Garcia, former Deputy
Director, Community Action
program of San Francisco
Earl Graves, President of
Earl Graves Associates
Aaron Henry, Chairman, Miss.
Democratic State Committee
John Hooker, practicing
attorney, Nashville, Tenn.
Patti Knox, Vice-Chairman,
Mich. Democratic State Committee
Louis Martin, Publisher of
the Chicago "Daily Defender"
Oscar Mauzy, State Senator
from Dallas, Texas
Katherine Peden, former state
Commerce Secretary of
Kentucky
Albert Pena, County
Commiss iotier
,
Bexar County,
Texas
Calvin Rampton, Governor of
Utah
Austin Ranney, Professor of
Political Science, University
of Wisconsin
Adlai Stevenson, State Treasurer
of Illinois
Carmen Warschaw, National
Commit teewoman from California
George Mitchell, National
Committeeman from Maine
David Mixner, Co-Director
of the Vietnam Moratorium
Committee
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection,
Mandate for Reform (Washington D.C.: Democratic National
Coimni 1 1 e e , 1 970 ) , p . 3
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had held hearings, introduced bills, lobbied for their
enactment, and had amended their party rules in every
possible way. Exception would also apply to states in
which anti-reform Democrats blocked the reforms as long
as the Commission was satisfied that a "good faith effort"
had been waged, similar to that described immediately
1 **
above
.
The Commission then settled down to the business at
hand and scheduled seventeen sites across the nation in
which it would hold its regional meetings. During these
hearings which ran sporadically from April to September,
over 500 persons testified before the Commission. These
people ranged from established party leaders to public
officials past and present, professors, party insurgents,
Young Democrats, and even a member of the Students for a
Democratic Society* (SDS). The Commission scoured the
country taking testimony from hundreds of diverse
Democrats who were able to convince it of only one thing
—
the pressing need for sweeping reform. Senator Edward
Kennedy spoke for many party members when he said:
New7 resources and energy and people flowed
into the party’s nominating process in 1968.
They came with desire and dedication and a will
to use the existing party machinery. Yet what
they encountered was a system which seemed
designed to discourage their participation.
They frequently found their efforts rebuffed,
diluted, or ignored. Encrusted practices,
inflexible rules, and obsolete laws sometimes
rendered tneir work entirely extraneous . 1
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Such prominent party figures as former Vice-President
Hubert Humphrey and Senators Edmund Muskie and Eugene
McCarthy testified to the Commission, each putting
forth his opinions on reform. Even some old line politicians
such as Mayor Richard Daley surprizingly appeared before
the Commission to testify.
Such friendliness did not greet the Commission in
all quarters of the party however. By its determination to
change long standing procedures of delegate selection and
by its failure to follow protocol in notifying state party
leaders of its hearings, the McGovern group managed to
anger several local political chieftains. In Louisiana,
when National Committeeman J. Marshall Brown was not
informed of the meeting, he was so infuriated that he
blasted the Commission for not obtaining proper clearance,
ordered the group to stay out of n his" state, and sent a
letter to National Chairman Harris demanding McGovern's
1
6
resignation. Though McGovern stayed on, the hearing was
moved to Jackson, Mississippi. In Texas the hearing site
was moved to three different cities, none of whose
leaders were particularly fond of "hanging the party's
dirty laundry" in the backyard of former President Johnson.
Yet the Commission did receive some cooperation from a few
Southern party leaders, and their attitude was not strictly
negative. One of the most blistering attacks of all on the
existing procedures came in Georgia when Atlanta Mayor
Ivan Allen testified:
The history of Democratic politics in
Georgia is a history of abuse and misuse of
the very system on which our nation and our
party was founded. If the Commission was
studying the kangaroo it would go to Australia.
Since you are interested in curing the evils
and ills of Democratic party organization and
practices, you have come to Georgia. A system
of delegate selection which allows a single
individual to hand pick convention delegates
without regard to democratic principles is
absurd and incongruous. It is especially so
when that individual has a long history of
disloyalty to the party, and publicly consorts
with, and supports enemies of the party. *7
The individual in question, Governor Maddox, together with
all of the Georgia party hierarchy refused to testify,
derisively branding the Commission as an arm of the
•'socialist wing" of the party.
And so it went for over five months, hearing the
pros and cons of party reform from all segments of the
party. During this entire period the Commission had been
chronically short of funds, since the $75,000 provided
by the National Committee barely covered staff costs.
Some members of the Commission personally covered travel
costs when hearings were held throughout the country.
Senator McGovern, Mrs. McGovern, and Senator Hughes each
leant $5000 to keep the operation afloat throughout the
1
8
year. Then in September the Commission settled down
to hammer out its findings. The Commission was unanimous
in some of its decisions and yet bitterly divided over
others. There was little opposition to most of the
proposals seeking to correct structural inadequacies.
*5
But there .were two areas on which the Commission
consensus collapsed. The first of these concerned the
fair and adequate representation of candidate support
throughout the selection process. The more militant
re f ormers advocated the imposition of proportional
representation in all states and at all levels, thus
effectively banning winner take all primaries. Many
former McCarthy backers remembered how in 1968 Robert
Kennedy won the California primary by a slim 140,000
votes out of over three million cast, yet he received all
of the state’s 174 delegates. The Commission agreed that
the abolition of the unit rule would preclude winner
take all systems in the convention states, but reached
a quite different conclusion with regard to primary states.
Most Commission members argued that a winner take all
primary did not technically comprise an imposition of a
unit rule, and that abolition of such primaries clearly
fell outside the Commission’s mandate. The best that the
Hughes faction could achieve was a motion to ’’recommend”
but not require^ that winner take all primaries be dropped.
The second point of contention was whether or not
the party's minority groups, notably the blacks, should be
represented in proportion to their numbers in the population.
This proposal, offered by Senator 13ayh and Professor Ranney,
was passed by a narrow 10-9 vote, demonstrating the deep
division in the Commission over these more controversial
items. The extension of the proportional representation
principle to women and young people touched off an even
hotter debate. illustrated by the following two quotes
:
Fred Dutton: We’ve got to provide the symbols
.
which will activate women
... act ivate young
people, which will appeal to them, and this is a
tangible device for doing just that.
Professor Beer: What we're doing
usurping the job of the voters. I.
us to say to the voters of a stat
to elect 50% women. If the voters
women or 75% men, its up to them,
would be a great mistake ...if we
you must have proportional repres
your convention. .. Our charge is t
process and make sure that people
free access to it. Our charge is
what the outcome is supposed to b
here is
Its not for
e you've got
want 75%
.
. I think it
tried to say
entation in
o clean up this
have full and
not to decide
e.19
In the end this too was adopted by the Commission
although to mollify its opponents, they added that this
was not meant to sanction "the imposition of mandatory
quotas
.
V
The Commission discussed these and several other
points of conflict before issuing its final report on
November 21, 1969. The nature and difficulty of the
Commission's work can best be seen by statements issued
by some of the Commission members after the culmination
of their task. Aaron Henry, chairman of the Mississippi
Democratic party, said he was "disappointed that the
Commission voted in the most conservative way on all the
major issues',', while Will Davis, a former Texas State
Committee Chairman, said that the reforms were "so radical
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that they will never be approved by the states."*" 0
Actually, most of the proposals which were ultimately
approved were a set of compromises carefully wrought
between these two extreme viewpoints. The guidelines
passed by the Commission are paraphrased below from the
Commission's published report, Mandate for Reform
,
pp. 38-48.
THE REFORM GUIDELINES
The following guidelines represented the Commission's
interpretation of the "full, meaningful, and timely"
language of its mandate. The Commission required the
states to adopt them, considering their adoption to
be the minimum actions state parties had to take to meet
the requirements of the Call to the 1972 Convention. The
guidelines were divided into three categories by the
Commission. The first of these (A) concerned rules
or practices which inhibited access to the delegate
selection process— items which imperiled full and
meaningful participat ion by inhibiting or preventing a
Democrat from exercising his part in the selection
of delegates.
A-l Elimination of all discrimination in delegate
selection procedures on the basis of race, color, creed,
or national origin was required. The Commission encouraged
state parties to take "affirmative steps" to stimulate
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minority group participation in party affairs and
minority group inclusion in the convention delegation
in reasonable relationship to the group's presence in the
population of the state." The Commission then stated
that this was not meant to sanction the imposition of
a quota system.
A-2 The Commission required the elimination of
discrimination on the basis of age or sex. It also required
state parties to amend their rules to allow and encourage
any Democrat over 18 to participate in all party affairs,
and demanded a "reasonable relationship" of women and
youth (defined as being between 18 and 30 years of age)
in state delegations, though again disavowing any
mandatory quotas.
A-5 The reform panel required state parties to
adopt and make readily accessible, written party rules
which described the state's delegate selection procedures
with sufficient clarity and detail. These rules were to
fix uniform statewide dates and times for each stage
in the selection process, thus eliminating some of the
discretionary powers from the hands of party satraps.
The adopted rules were to include provisions for
apportionment of delegates, selection and responsibilities
of the state committee, nomination procedures for delegates
and alternates, the filling of vacancies, and the filing
of challenges and minority reports.
The next category of the guidelines (B) dealt with
rules or practices which diluted the influence of a
party member in the delegate selection process after
he had gained access to it.
B—l The Commission felt that proxy voting was
inconsistent with the spirit of equal participation,
giving an unjustified advantage to the holder of the
proxies to affect the outcome of a vote. Therefore it
outlawed the use of proxy votes at all stages of delegate
selection, requiring state parties to include in their
written party rules provisions specifically forbidding
the use of proxies.
B-2 In many states, voters chose state committees
or conventions without knowledge that such bodies had
a role in delegate selection. The Commission required
that state parties make it clear to voters that they
are participating in a process which will nominate the
party’s candidate for president, and make known to the
voters the role which such bodies have in delegate
selection.
B-3 Party committees participating in the delegate
selection process have in the past conducted business
with only a fraction of their members present. Thus the
interests of much of the rank and file may not be
represented due to the absence of various spokesmen. In
some states quorum requirements were either totally
lacking or ridiculously low, hence the Commission
required all state parties to set quotas at no lower
than 40%,
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B-4 This guideline required that alternates
to the convention be selected in the same manner as
delegates, forcing state parties to amend their rules
to provide for selection of alternates by either primary,
convention, or committee. In cases in which vacancies
occurred, they were to be filled in the original manner,
or if time did not permit, then by the rest of the
delegation sitting as an ad hoc committee.
B-5 In accordance with the 1968 convention
order, the Commission required state parties to insert
in their rules provisions outlawing the unit rule at
all stages of the selection process and forbidding the
practice of "instructing” delegates to vote against
their stated preferences.
B-7 In regard to apportionment, the Commission
required that in alloting delegates to all bodies
concerned with delegate selection, equal weight be given
to population and Democratic voting strength. Another
provision required that states employing a convention system
select at least 75# of their delegation at the congressional
district level or lower.
The third category of guidelines (C) had to do with
rules and practices which had attributes of both the
first and second classifications, thus impeding both
access to, and influence on the delegate selection process.
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^”1 Adequate public notice was deemed essential
to full participation by the Commission. Therefore it
required the publicizing of the times, places, and
rules of conduct for all public meetings of the party
and the holding of such meetings in easily accessible
places. Each candidate for delegate had to be given
the opportunity to state his presidential preference
at each stage of the selection process, and those who
did not state such a preference must be labeled
"uncommitted"
.
C-2 In the past, public or party officeholders
had been chosen as delegates to county, state, and
national conventions by virtue of their official
position (ex-officio delegates). This violated the
accepted methods by which delegates were to be elected
—
primary, convention, or committee. It also violated the
timely selection provision since most ex-officio delegates
are elected or appointed prior to the convention’s
calendar year. Finally, it violated the "full and
meaningful opportunity" provision by eliminating
competition for some seats by making them automatic
appointments. Consequently, the Commission required
state parties to abolish rules which allowed for
the appointment of ex-officio delegates.
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C-k In some states, governors, state chairmen,
county chairmen, or other officials, all chosen before
the convention's calendar year, selected delegate slates
or chose agents which selected them. Since this was
inconsistent with the timely selection provision, the
Commission required state parties to prohibit practices
by which such officials chose nominating committees
or proposed or endorsed delegate slates.
C-6 When slates were presented to caucuses, conventions,
committees, or voters in a primary, the Commission
required that the state parties adopt procedures which
would assure that: (l) The slate making body was elected
or assembled with adequate public notice. (2) Slates
presented in a primary under a candidate’s name were
assembled only after due consultation with the candidate.
( 3 ) Adequate procedural safeguards were provided for
challenging the slate which would not put an undue
burden on the challengers.
In addition to these "required" guidelines, the
Commission urged state parties to adopt certain recommended
changes. The term "urged" meant that the stated purpose
was within the Commission's mandate, that the Commission
considered their adoption desireable, but that it was
not prepared to require their adoption before the
21
1972 convention.
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A-3 The Commission considered full opportunity
to participate incumbent upon voter registration laws
and customs. Lengthy residence requirements, literacy
tests, short and untimely registration periods, and
infrequent enrollment drives, all detracted from full
participation. State parties were thus urged to repeal
all such laws in order to alleviate barriers to full
participation.
A-h It was the feeling of the Commission that
full and meaningful opportunity was impeded by
excessive costs, fees, and assessments, and urged state
parties to remove all costs and fees in excess of ten
doLlars at all levels of the process, and to eliminate
mandatory assessments entirely. Also recommended was
removal of excessive petition requirements for would-be
delegates. These were defined as being in excess of one
percent of either Democratic votes cast in the last
election, or of Democratic party enrollment.
B-6 This provision urged that state parties adopt
procedures providing for fair representation of minority
candidate support and recommended that the 1972 Convention
adopt a rule requiring state parties to represent
minority views at every level of delegate selection.
Also recommended was that at-large delegates be divided
between candidates according to their demonstrated
strength in the convention or primary.
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C-3 The Commission urged that delegate selection
be opened to all Democrats and persons wishing to
become Democrats. It therefore urged state parties
to provide for easy access and frequent opportunity of
enrollment for non-Deniocrats who wish to become party
members
.
C-5 Although the 1968 Convention indicated
no preference between primary, committee, and
convention systems, the Commission felt tiiat committee
systems by virtue of their indirect relationship to
the rank and file offered fewer safeguards for a
full and meaningful opportunity to participate. The
Commission realized that elimination of the committee
system was outside its mandate, but required that no
more than 10% of a state’s delegation be chosen in
this manner and further urged state parties to forbid
committees from selecting even this number of
convention delegates.
These then were the reforms. The products of
months of research, investigation, and testimony, they
were finally brought forth after many years of frustration,
disappointment, and struggle. They required the state
parties to purge themselves of many blatantly
undemocratic practices which had been festering in the
system for decades. They further recommended that the
state parties take the initiative in abolishing lesser
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offenses which have also served to impede fair and
democratic delegate selection in the past. Their
thrust was calculated to assure that the 1972
Convention would be the most representative and
democratic in the party’s history. In the words of
Senator McGovern, the Commission’s Chairman:
These reforms are
going on in the party,
intelligent Democratic
to identify x^ith them,
maintain the support of
otherwise lose interest
There has never been a
when confronted with a
and death, lias chosen
hope that this will be
the only dynamic thing
Within a year most
politicians arc going
Through them we can
millions who would
in politics...
political party which
choice between reform
reform. I sincerely
the first. 22
CHAPTER III
IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORM
We are now all discovering that
convention reform is easier to advocate
than to accomplish.
Senator Fred Harris
Newsweek, May 5 , 1969
REACTIONS OF PARTY LEADERS
After a set of reform guidelines had been announced,
the question remained: how effective would they actually
be in eliminating the abuses of tie past? The answer
to this question was dependent on numerous variables
which, when taken together, would determine whether the
reform package would be a vigorous and meaningful
innovation or just an empty exercise in rhetoric.
The first clue to the effectiveness of the guidelines
was the degree of importance accorded them by prominent
party leaders. A negative or apathetic attitude on the
part of the party chieftains would probably dampen the
initial fervor of the reforming spirit. The response of
the party dignitaries, however, was nearly unanimous in
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lauding the Commission’s work. Almost to a man most
leading Democrats, including several prominent
presidential hopefuls, came out in favor of the
guidelines. A sampling of their favorable responses
includes the following examples:
I firmly believe that the 1972 convention
will be the most open political convention
in American history if people across the
country dedicate themselves to the full and
fair implementation of the guidelines
contained in the report.
Senator George McGovern
The McGovern Commission has engaged in
a searching and honest examination of the
problems of party reform. Its guidelines
provide us with a base on which to build a
more effective party, which is responsive
and respons ible
.
Senator Edmund Muskie
In 1968 many people were asked to test
our political system through the Democratic
party. That system was found lacking. If
people are to turn to the Democratic party
again, there must be substantial evidence
that the events of 1998 will not recur...
These guidelines if enforced will open up
the party to new ideas and new people. The
danger is that this document will become
just one more paper that politicians may
prefer to ignore rather than implement. The
Democratic party must, if it is to be worthy
of its name, reform its own processes and
procedures
.
Senator Eugene McCarthy
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The members and staff of the Commission
deserve the party’s thanks for reporting early
enough so that all state and local party
organizations wil 1 have ample opportunity
to achieve full compliance in time for the
next convent ion.
. . The guidelines are a major
step toward the Democratic party's goal
of broadening citizen partic ipation in the
nominating process.
Senator Edward Kennedy
The work of the Commission chaired
by Senator McGovern spotlights a crucial
question confronting our nation today:
whether out traditional political party
system can be modernized and rehabilitated
to meet the challenges of the democratic
process in the 1970's. I believe that we
will meet that test.
DNC Chairman Lawrence O'Brien
I am impressed with the work of the
McGovern Commission, and I believe the
great majority of Democrats will welcome its
guidelines as being fair and long overdue.
We have no greater task than assuring that
ours will be an open party, encouraging the
widest possible participation in all of our
affairs ... The guidelines of the Commission
are an important step toward this goal.
Senator Fred Harris
Former DNC Chairman*
Not all the party luminaries were so impressed with
the reforms, although given the politician's natural
propensity for capitalizing on popular positions, they
also joined in showering the Commission with praise.
j o i n e dFormer Vice-President Humphrey, for example,
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the chorus of prominent Democrats in saluting the
Commission’s work:
I commend the McGovern Commission for
giving the Democratic party the most
comprehensive and detailed analysis and
recommendations in its history of delegate
selection. I am confident that the national
and state parties will find the Commission's
work to be most helpful in achieving a party
capable of meeting the critical issues of
the 1 970 ' s , 2
Despite this endorsement, it was widely felt that
Mr. Humphrey was opposed to the Commission's work. He
had not testified before the Commission, preferring
instead to send a written message which warned that:
"to be a regular is not necessarily to be wrong. He
consistently referred to the guidelines as "recommendations"
and was known to have actively opposed Senator Hughes’
appointment to head the Commission. Moreover, his
executive assistant William Connell, whose statements
often reflected Humphrey’s views, criticized the
Commission for being too obsessed with establishing direct
popular election of delegates, and stated that the
Commission "by treating hard working local party leaders
as outcasts, and embracing new left positions, is doing
h
a great job of party splintering." Furthermore, Humphrey
had been instrumental in replacing "reformer" Harris with
"regular" O'Brien as National Committee Chairman.
6l
Humphrey reflected the fears of the old Democratic
stalwarts that the McGovern group by its actions was
attempting to shatter the existing power relationships
in the party and divest the elder statesmen of their
control of the party machinery. Even though many party
v
leaders were hostile to the reform concept, it is
probably safe to conclude that most Democratic politicians
were prepared to accept the guidelines and would make
no open attempt to oppose them. Yet even at this
fairly early stage in the process, the beginnings
of a split in the party over the new guidelines was
evident. Many persons felt that if this embryonic schism
were allowed to mushroom it would eventually engulf the
entire party, and thus a concentrated effort was begun
to establish the legitimacy of the guidelines.
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ACTION
An important factor in determining the ultimate
fate of the guidelines was the action taken on them
by the party’s organizational hierarchy. The question of
the relationship between the Commission and the existing
party machinery touched off quite a fight. The paramount
issue was the question of the legal status of the
Commission and its guidelines. The Commission in its
report maintained that it had been mandated by the
19^8 Convention and was responsible to no other body
until the convening of the 1972 Convention, which
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would be the sole arbiter of the Commission
' s work.
After issuing its guidelines the Commission did not
disband, but remained functional in order to aid the
state parties in complying with the reforms. Senator
McGovern admitted however that the Commission itself
had no enforcement powers, being dependent upon the
1972 convention’s Credentials Committee to uphold
its guidelines.
The National Committee was irked by the independence
exerted by the Commission and constantly sought to
extend influence over it. The National Committee
stressed that it was the primary body responsible for
conduct of all party affairs, and attempted to make
the Commission subservient to its will. Shortly after
the issuance of the guidelines the first battle over
the Commission's autonomy took place. It was more of
a skirmish between Democratic National Committee Chairman
Lawrence O'Brien and Commission Chairman McGovern, and
when the smoke cleared, the issue had been settled in
the Commission's favor.
On May 22, 1970, Chairman O'Brien named an ad hoc
committee of eleven National Committee members to screen
the proposals, making it clear that they were free to
recommend the adoption of some guidelines and ignore
others. Senator McGovern immediately issued a statement
reaffirming that the Commission was solely an arm of
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the 1968 Convention and did not recognize the
National Committee as its overseer.'5 The next day
David Mixner, a member of the Commission, levelled a
blast at O’Brien and the National Committee: "Its not
up to Chairman O’Brien and eleven other people to say
’We'll pick the reforms we like and ignore the others.'
We had a mandate and we produced a well thought out
report. We do not have to seek out the approval of
the National Committee.” 6 Chairman O'Brien then hastily
called a press conference and denied that there was any
move afoot to dilute the McGovern proposals, but
conceded that the ad hoc panel could recommend to the
committee a different version of reforms and the
National Committee still different ones if they saw fit.
Senator McGovern then forcefully asserted that the
Commission guidelines were the prescribed criteria that
all state parties had to meet in selecting delegates,
and had to be inserted into the Convention Call intact.
O'Brien, seeking to forestall charges of whitewash and
perhaps a fatally divisive schism, capitulated, on
May 2^ he issued a statement "clarifying" the ad hoc
committee's role, saying that they "would have no power
to alter, dilute, or in any way veto guidelines already
7
adopted by the Commission." It was over; the Commission
had come away victorious in its first joust with the
National Committee.
6k
Nine months later, in February of 1971, the
National Committee met to issue the Preliminary Call
to the 1972 Convention. There was surprizingly little
debate, and the Committee incorporated the guidelines
into the Call with the following language:
Be it resolved by the Democratic National
Committee that:
(A) With respect to those guidelines of
the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate
Selection to the Democratic National Convention
(April 1970), that said Commission "requires"
state parties to adopt pursuant to the "full
meaningful and timely" mandate of the 1908
Convention, the Democratic National Committee
adopts such guidelines as the standards
that state parties in qualifying and certifying
delegates to the 1972 Democratic Convention
must make all efforts to comply with, and
(B) With respect to those guidelines of
said report that the Commission. .. "urges"
state Democratic parties to adopt, the
Democratic National Committee joins in urging
the implementation of such guidelines by
state Democratic parties in qualifying and
certifying delegates to the 1972 Democratic
National Convention.
8
The one alteration the Committee made was that
whereas the Commission expressly outlawed ex-officio
delegates (Section C-2), the Call allowed for the
National Committee members from each state to serve as
delegates, although to comply with the timely selection
provision they had to be the incoming officials elected
in the convention’s calendar year; in the past even
lame duck committee members chosen four years earlier
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were allowed to participate as delegates. At a
subsequent meeting of the Committee in October however,
after Chief Counsel Joseph Califano ruled that this
exception was indeed a violation of the guidelines
and could precipitate successful challenges, the
Committee voted 66-3^ to deprive themselves of
o
automatic delegate positions. This swift and total
incorporation of the McGovern Commission guidelines
into the Call by the National Committee was widely
viewed as a significant victory for the reform
movement
.
A tougher battle took place when the National
Committee reviewed the proposals of a second reform
panel, the Commission on Rules, also set up by the
1968 Convention and chaired by Congressman James G.
O’Hara of Michigan. This body was charged with reforming
and streamlining many of the archaic rules and
procedures by which the national convention was run,
with the intention of creating a more democratic
and efficient convention. Most all of its guidelines were
procedural in nature and need not detain us. One
reform under its jurisdiction however, which had a
great bearing on delegate selection was reform of
the delegate apportionment formula. A brief examination
of this topic is therefore germane to our investigation
of delegate selection.
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The formula in use at the time was based on
electoral college strength, thereby giving equal
representation to both Republicans and nonvoters as
well as to Democrats and thus strongly discriminating
against the more Democratic ares of the country.
Because the basis was electoral vote rather than
population, small states had an advantage over
larger states, again diminishing the influence of
one of the party's areas of strength— the urban
centers. Attempts to correct this situation by
awarding bonus delegates to states which voted Democratic
were corrupted by excessive leniency which allowed
states to receive bonuses if they had gone Democratic
in the last presidential, senatorial, or gubernatorial
election. This resulted in nearly all states receiving
some bonus delegates, thus effectively nullifying the
plan's original intent.
After many months of deliberating this touchy
subject, the O'Hara Commission formulated a new
apportionment plan based 50%o on population and 50%
on the state's Democratic voting strength as
averaged in the last three presidential elections.
It entirely eliminated the bonus votes and tiie votes
given to the 110 members of the National Committee.
This new formula would give the party's industrial
centers a greater weight at the convention. For example,
the eight largest states would control 50 %o of the
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convention's votes whereas in 1968 it took thirteen
states to do so; at the opposite end of the spectrum,
the ten smallest states would only control 2.8$
of the votes as compared with 8.7$ in 1968. 10
In February of 1971 the Democratic Executive
Committee refused to agree to this change and overturned
it on a 7-4 vote. "Those who overturned it were old-
time organization Democrats (Jacob Arvev of Chicago and
Mayor Joseph Barr of Pittsburgh), Southerners (Marshall
Brown of Louisiana, Ruth Jordan of Alabama, and Robert
Strauss of Texas), and the party hierarchy (Chairman
O'Brien and Mrs. Geri Joseph a former National Vice-
Chairman). It was in effect a new—politics versus old-
politics split." 11 The Executive Committee then proposed
its own formula based 53$ on electoral college vote
and 47$ on the average Democratic voting strength in
the past three presidential elections. The derivation
of this formula can be found in Table 8. (See Table 9 also)
Many reformers were upset that the O'Hara proposal,
drawn up after a year of study was rejected by the
Executive Committee after only one day of debate. They
argued that the reform was being treated in a precipitate
and cursory manner. The Committee members retorted that
their formula was very progressive and a definite
improvement over the allocation schemes of the past.
When the allocation dispute was presented to the full
National Committee which had assembled to receive the
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TABLE 8
*
Derivation of the Executive Committee Formula
State
Votes
Based on
Electoral
Vote
Votes
Based on
Democratic
Support
Total
Vote
Ala. 27 10 37
Alas
.
r 9 1 10
Ariz 18 7 25
Ark. 18 9 27
Cal. 135 136 271
Colo 21 15 36
Conn. 24 27 51
Del
.
9 k 13
Fla. 51 30 81
Ga. 36 17 53
Haw. 12
,
5 17
Ida. 12 5 17
111. 78 92 170
Ind 39 37 76
Iowa 2k 22 46
Kans 21 14 35
Ky. 27 20 47
La. 30 14 44
Me. 12 8 20
Md. 30 23 53
Mass k2 60 102
Mich. 63 69 132
Minn. 30 34 64
Miss 21 4 25
Mo
.
36 37 73
Mont 12 5 17
Neb 15 9 24
Nev. 9 2 11
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State
Vote
Based on
Electoral
Vote
Vote
Based on
Democratic
Support
Total
Vote
N.H. 12 6 18
N.J. 51 58 109
N.M. 12 6 18
N.Y. 123 155 278
N.C. 39 25 6*4
N.D. 9 5 1*4
Ohio 75 78 153
Olcla. 2*4 15 39
Ore
.
18 16 34
Penn, 81 101 182
R.I. 12 10 22
S.C. 2k 8 32
S.D. 12 5 17
Tenn. 30 19 49
Tex. 78 52 130
Utah 12 7 19
Vt. 9 3 12
Va. 36 17 53
Wash
.
27 25 52
W. Va. 18 17 35
Wise 33 34 67
Wyo. 9 2 11
D.C. 9 6 15
161*4 1386 3000
Judith Parris, The Convention Problem (Washington D.C.
The Brookings Institute, 1972 ) , pp. 32-33.
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reports of the two Reform Commissions, the O’Hara
proposal was beaten down 68-27, and the Executive
Committee formula was approved with only one
dissenting vote. In an analysis of the Committee’s
actions, New York Times national political editor
R. W. Apple wrote:
That the Committee adopted a slightly
more conservative option which will to a degree
protect the smaller states, was not surprizing.
Nor was it surprizing that the members voted
to give themselves votes at the convention.
The Committee is after all, an inherently
conservative body full of party wheelhorses,
former governors, fundraisers, and machine
carryovers. It is heavily weighted in favor
of the smaller states. What is surprizing is
that the Committee went as far as it did.
That can probably be attributed to t tie trauma
of 1968 and the mortal fear that a repetition
could obliterate what now appears to be a
good chance to win in 1972.1-
COURT SUITS
With the issuance of the Call to the 1972
Convention by the National Committee, the national
party discharged its duty as far as the reforms were
concerned. Bowing to the demands of party unity it
approved the entire package, finding no item so
unpalatable as to be eliminated. The reforms could
not be all things to all people however. Soon,
differences of opinion surfaced, manifesting
themselves in a series of legal conflicts. The
allocation formula determining the states' relative
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TABLE 9*
Comparison of Allocation Formulas
State
1968
Formula
0
’ Hara
Formula
Committee
Formula
Ala. 32 36 37
Alas
.
22 4 10
Ariz 19 21 25
Ark. 13 24 27
Cal. 174 294 271
Colo 35 32 36
Conn. 44 51 51
Del. 22 8 13
D.C. 23 12 15
Fla. 63 ' 83 81
Ga
.
43 52 53
Haw
.
26 11 17
Ida. 25 10 17
111. 118 181 170
Ind 63 79 76
Iowa 46 45 46
Kans 38 32 35
Ky. 46 46 47
La. 36 42 44
Me. 27 16 20
Md. 49 54 53
Mass 72 108 102
Mich. 96 140 132
Minn 52 64 64
Miss. 24 21 25
Mo. 60 75 73
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State
1968
Formula
0
' Ilara
Formula
Committee
Formula
Mon t
,
26 11 17
Neb
.
30 21 24
Nev. 22 6 11
N.H. 26 12 18
N.J. 82 115 109
N.M. 26 14 18
N.Y. 190 301 278
N.C. 59 65 64
N.D. 25 10 14
Ohio 115 163 153
Okla. 41 35 39
Ore 35 32 34
Penn. 130 196 182
R.I. 27 18 22
s.c. 28 28 32
S.D. 26 11 17
Tenn. 51 49 49
Tex. 104 139 130
Utah 26 15 19
vt. 22 7 12
Va. 54 53 53
Wash. 47 53 52
W. Va. 38 32 35
Wise
.
59 69 67
Wyo. 22 5 11
*The New York Times, February 20, 1971, p.l.
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strengths at the convention immediately became a
central point of dispute, and was assailed with
equal vehemence from both the left and right wings
of the party. The effects which the apportionment
formula would have on the voting strengths of several
selected groups of states can be found in Tables
10 through 12.
Many of the party's Southern politicians,
particularly those whose states gave their electoral
votes to George Wallace in 1968 and/or to Barry
Goldwater in 1964, were upset at the weight given to
Democratic voting strength in the last three presidential
elections. They saw this as an attempt by the party's
Northeastern liberals to embarass the Southern states
and deprive them of their traditional position of
power and influence at the convention. Under the new
formula the 11 Southern states would receive 390 votes
on the basis of electoral vote, but only 205 on the basis
of Democratic support. This represented only 14.8# of
the 1386 Democratic support votes, whereas the 12
largest states outside the South received 891 votes, or
64.3#. (see Table 12) The large states received 46.8#
of their total strength from electoral vote and 53.2#
from Democratic support— very closely approximating the
overall formula. The South however, received 65.5# of
their strength from electoral vote, and only 34.5# from
Democratic support.
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TABLE 10
Voting Strength of Selected Groups of States, as a
Percentage of Total, at Democratic Conventions, 1952-1972
Group 1952 1956 I960 1964 1968 1972
Ten most
populous states 43.7 41.8 41 .
6
45.7 43.6 53.3
Ten least
populous states 7.5 8.2 7.9 7.3 9.1 4.6
South 23.6 24.3 23.1 22.5 20.1 19.7
Judith Parris, The Convention Problem (Washington D.C.:
The Brookings Institute, 1972), p.34.
TABLE 11
*
Voting Strength of Selected Croups of States, as a
Percentage of Total, at the 1972 Democratic Convention
Group
Actual
1972
Formula
100#
Population
Formula
100#
Electoral
College
Formula
100#
Democratic
Support
Formula
Ten most
populous
states 53.3 54.9 48.1 60.0
Ten least
populous
states 4.6 3.3 6.3 2.7
South 19.7 19.1 24.2 14.6
*Judi th Parris, The Convention Problem (Washington D.C.:
The Brookings Institute, 1972 ) , p.48.
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TABLE 12
Derivation of Voting Strength Under the 1972 AllocationFormula for Selected Groups of States
Group
Percent of
Electoral
College
Based Votes
Percent of
Democratic
Support
Based Votes
Percent of
Total
Convention
Votes
Twelve most
populous states
(outside South) 48.6 64.3 55.9
Fifteen least
populous states 7.2 5.3
.
CO
Southern states 24.1 ' 14.8 19.8
Table 12 was compiled by the author, based on the raw
vote figures found in Table 8.
Spearheading the Southern opposition to the
formula was Governor Lester Maddox of Georgia, who
somewhat ironically appealed to the courts to uphold
their one raan-one vote ruling of 1964 and demand that
allocation be based solely on population. In October of
1970 a state court in Seattle upheld this view in the
allocation of delegates to the state convention,
reasoning that a delegate, though not a public official,
is a representative of the area from which he is elected
and his function is to present the views of all of the
1
3
voters living in his district. The case was taken to
Federal District Court and there it was decided that
the method of allocating convention votes was
essentially a political matter for the parties to
resolve and therefore not a justiciable issue. In
July of 1971 a Federal Appelate Court upheld this
view by rejecting the appeal of t lie Maddox suit.
Concurrent with the Maddox suit, a second, more
determined, more highly organized, and more potentially
dangerous attack was being launched from the left, led
by the liberal National Committee members from New York
and California, the Americans for Democratic Action,
and Kenneth Bode, the former Research Director of the
McGovern Commission. Many viewed this as an early start
on behalf of the dissidents in getting the party off
to its usual round of internicine warfare. The liberals
went even further than the Rules Commission, seeking to
base allocation solely on the basis of Democratic voting
strength (a one Democrat-one vote basis). In June of 1971
they obtained a favorable verdict in Federal District
Court when it overturned the Executive Committee's
formula charging that it violated the Supreme Court's
one man-one vote edict on equal representation, was
"discriminatory, without rational basis, and unconstitutional"
and "constituted a substantial debasing of the votes
of Democrats in large states." Under the one Democrat-
one vote formula the ten largest states would increase
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the size of their delegations from 1397 to 162*1, those
of the eleven Southern states would drop from 595 to
and those of the thirteen smallest states would lose
1 U 1
75 votes.
The National Committee appealed the ruling and
won a reversal in a U.S. Appeals Court on September 30,
which questioned the validity of basing allocation
on Democratic presidential votes alone since Republicans
and Independents as well as Democrats voted for the
Democratic pres iden t ial nominee in the general election.
The court refused to recognize a clear correlation
between a citizen's right to vote on a one man-one vote
basis, and a party member's right to choose his national
convention delegates on the same principle . The court
ordered the reinstatement of the Executive Committee
formula, and when in January of 1972 the Supreme Court,
to whom the liberals had now appealed, refused to hear
the case, the matter was finally settled.
Thus we have seen that the only reform which was
not accepted in its original form by the National
Committee was the O'Hara Commission's recommended
allocation formula. Though modified by the National
Committee, the new allocation proposal was still much
closer to the O’Hara formula than to the formulas of
the past. This compromise plan which had its baptism of
fire in the courts was the only major reform to come
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under such stringent attack, and its successful
maintaincnce was construed as a portent of success
for the entire reform effort.
STATE PARTY COMPLIANCE
The most important factor in assessing the
success of the guidelines was of course the degree
of compliance achieved by the state parties. The
McGovern Commission after issuing its guidelines
had not dissolved, but continued to fulfill its mandate
which required it to aid the state parties in fully
meeting the guidelines set forth in the Call to the
1972 Convention. To accomplish this the Commission
sent a copy of the guidelines to all the state
chairmen together with a letter urging the
establishment of state reform panels to act as the
Commission's counterparts on the state level,
serving as a coordinating body and a conduit of
information, the Commission immediately began to press
the states for action in putting the guidelines into
practice. The Commission realized that many states
needed legislative action, that the legislative process
was a slow one, and that many states have short
legislative sessions. Therefore it had tried to accomplish
its work as quickly as possible in order to give the
states a sufficiently reasonable amount of time to
implement the reforms.
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The process was very slow in getting off the ground,
and many months passed before every state finally
established its reform commission. The remainder of
1970 was slow in producing any results, as most states
were either still unreconciled to the idea of reform, or
just beginning to get reform procedures under way.
As 1971 rolled around, the tempo of reform picked up
and a number of states were certified by the Commission
as being in full compliance with the guidelines.
However by May only eight states had been certified;
it had been thirteen months since publication of the
Commission's report, and in only seven months 1972
would arrive.
As time passed, several voices were raised in
4
concern that the states would not meet the guidelines
in time for the convention. One of the loudest and most
persistent critics of the slow pace of reform was
Kenneth Bode, the former Research Director of the
Commission. Bode had resigned this post in January of 1971,
and had set up the Center for Political Reform, an
independent agency founded to monitor the implementation
of the guidelines. In July of 1971 Bode published an
article fiercely attacking the footdragging actions
of the states, and urging the national party to take
affirmative actions in obtaining state compliance,
lie pointed out that the eight states in full compliance
comprised only 10$ of the convention's delegates, and
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that not one of the eleven largest states, with 56%
of the delegates, had come into full compliance.
Twenty-four states still permitted untimely selection,
and thirty—two states had taken no actions toward
removing sex and age barriers. Bode cited the fact that
of 23 states needing legislative action, only 2 had
completed their task. He then outlined where the
reform program stood in the 7 largest states, and
concluded that the program was bogging down. He attacked
Chairman O'Brien for not vigorously pushing for reform,
and the Commission for not having adequate staff to
do a thorough job.^^
Mr. Bode's article brought an immediate reply
from Representative Ronald Fraser of Minnesota, who
had taken over the Commission chairmanship when
Senator McGovern resigned in January to pursue the
Democratic presidential nomination. Fraser argued that
every state had set up a reform commission, that every
state had taken some actions, that 10 states were in
full compliance, and that 28 more were expected to
complete action within six months.
Since Mr. Bode's article was written,
2 of the 11 largest states (Ohio and New
Jersey) have come into full compliance.
Mr. Bode's figure of 2W states that have not
met the timeliness requirement is now
down to 15.... Our Commission is determined
to achieve full compliance by all 50 states.
We are already planning to increase our
staff for the final twelve months of our
effort to achieve reform. We have been
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promised further help by Mr. O’Brien...
In short
,
we are encouraged by the progress
so far throughout the country. l7
The picture which developed in 1971 therefore can
be summarized as follows. Many state politicians and
party leaders were wary of the reform effort and
hesitant to push it forward with any vigor. This
prompted many of the more ardent reformers to protest
that the reform effort was being abandoned or betrayed
by the national party leaders. Like Mr. Bode, many
reformers continued to press the party for action. The
Commission, caught in the middle, strapped for funds,
short of staff, and devoid of enforcement powers,
could only continue to plod ahead slowly. Urging,
pleading, and cajoling the state parties to complete
their reform efforts quickly, the Commission was
engaged in a long and tedious task, but as more and
more stages completed action on the reforms it appeared
that full compliance would be achieved. A rough
approximation of the schedule of compliance can be found
in Table 13.
This result was achieved however only after a
long and hard uphill struggle. In the beginning there
had been an air of ambiguity and uncertainty as to the
importance to be accorded the reforms, with some states
hoping the reform effort would collapse and thus spare
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TABLE 13
*
Schedule of Compliance
1971
May
Ala. Mo.
Iowa N.H.
Maine N.C.
Miss. Okla.
August
N. J. Ohio
October
Ariz
.
Minn
.
Colo. S.D.
Ida.
December
t
Alas Tex. Wash
Cal. Tenn. Wise
Nev
.
Utah
S.C. Va.
1972
January
Ark Kans N.D.
Conn. Ky. Ore
.
Del. Mass Penn
Fla. Mont vt.
Ga. • Neb. W. Va
111. N.M. Wyo.
Ind N.Y.
February
Haw. Mich
La. R.I.
Md.
*
The New York Times
,
December 16
,
197i f p. 60.
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then the rigors of reform. In some states the reforms
were not given a high priority and were not
forcefully advocated by the Democratic party leaders,
and as a nsult were defeated. In other states,
Democrats who honestly labored for reform saw their
work wrecked at the hands of the opposition party.
An example is Nevada where a bill to adopt a new
primary system was killed. The plan would have
included proportional representation, with delegates
being distributed according to the strength shown by
candidates in the presidential preference balloting.
Governor Paul Laxault, a Republican, vetoed the bill.
The delegates would continue ,to be chosen by the
existing state convention system, and the state
Democratic leaders could justify their actions, pointing
out that a "good faith" effort had been made, only
1 8to be scuttled by a Republican governor.
A similar situation occured in California where two
Democratically sponsored bills to reform the primary were
passed by the legislature, but were vetoed by Governor
Ronald Reagan. The first was a bill to make the primary
mandatory for all nationally recognized candidates
along the lines of the Oregon primary; the other would
have ended the winner take all provision by electing
delegates at the congressional district level, therefore
allowing for greater expression of minority candidate
. 19
support.
8k
In other states there was a split in the party
leadership, with strong reform and anti-reform
factions struggling for supremacy. These states were
typified by an acceptance of some of the reform
proposals, but a stubborn opposition to others, even
at the cost of having the delegation challenged at Miami.
In Arkansas the reformers pushed for the establishment
of a primary. As it passed the legislature however,
it was solely a delegate primary with no provision
for a presidential preference race. Also, candidates
for delegate were not allowed to express their
presidential preferences on the ballot. This arrangement
was reportedly promoted by Representative Wilbur Mills
who saw it as the best means of electing an uncommitted
delegation. This type of alignment would be the most
useful in support of his budding presidential candidacy
and would provide him with the most leverage at the
convention. Due to the possibility of a challenge
however, this primary scheme was repealed in favor of
a state convention system. On the whole, this was a
vast improvement over the former system of appointment
20by the state committee
.
In Connecticut reform efforts also ran into
conflict with a formidable opposing faction. State party
leaders decided to maintain the state's convention
system and modified it to adjust to the McGovern proposals
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by choosing 7
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ch of the delegates at the congressional
district level and the remaining 25% at large. State
Chairman John Dailey reluctantly supported the move
saying: "We had to do what we had to do. If we had not
changed our rules our delegation to the convention
would have been challenged.” However, many town and
city committees throughout the state which selected
the delegates to the convention were themselves
elected in an undemocratic and untimely manner in that
they engaged in self-endorsement, a process by which
they nominated themselves for reelection two years
before the convention. In a stormy session of the state
committee Baileyfailed to break the power of local
leaders, and self-endorsement was upheld. Thus
delegate selection was ultimately based on a system
whose roots violated the guidelines of openness and
timely selection. Though not a flagrant violation, and
though a "good faith” effort at reform was made, the
possibility of a challenge remained.
Many state party leaders were more discreet in
their opposition. They engaged in token compliance
by outwardly accepting the reforms, but informally
trying to sabotage them. They adopted tactics designed
to sidestep, circumvent, stretch, delete, dilute,
ignore, or otherwise impede the successful functioning
of the reforms. These tactics were characteristic of
states with prominent party machines. For example in
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Pennsylvania, where in 1968 a quarter of the delegation
was appointed by the state committee, the practice
was not totally abolished as in many other states,
but merely pared down to the 10% maximum compatible
with t.ho reform guidelines. And even though for the
first time candidates for delegate would be allowed
to express their presidential preferences on the ballot,
provisions were also made for running uncommitted
slates. Gerald New, Executive Director of the state
committee, explained the machine's strategy this way:
"County organizations all over the state will run
uncommitted delegations, and in most cases elect them."
Peter Camiel, Democratic Committee Chairman for
Philadelphia, recalled that in the 1970 City Council
elections 65 candidates ran, and even though the five
organization-backed candidates’ names were scattered
22throughout the ballot, they won. By employing such
a strategy, party leaders hoped to keep much of
Pennsylvania's 182 vote delegation uncommitted.
This was also the case in Illinois, where the state's
foremost Democrat, Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley,
had long exercised an iron grasp over the delegation.
In 1968, 70 of the 120 Illinois delegates were selected
at large by a state convention composed of persons
selected by party committeemen throughout the state.
Two more delegates were provided by the Daley—appoi nted
National Committee members. The remaining 48 were
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elected at the congressional district level in a
primary; again, a number of the Chicago districts were
tightly controlled by the mayor. Although he testified
at the Commission hearings in Chicago and even proposed
his own reform plan, it was obvious that Mayor Daley
would not be willing to let such enormous power
slip so easily from his hands. Illinois did enact most
of the reform proposals including expanding the number
of delegates elected at the primary, instituting a
presidential preference race, allowing delegates to
express their presidential preferences on the ballot,
and barring the National Committee members from
ex-officio status. Despite this however, many persons
felt that the mayor would find some means by which to
continue to exert his influence over the Illinois
delegation.
On the other side of the spectrum were the states
which fully complied with the reform proposals by
making a good faith effort at implementation by
amending party rules, changing state laws, and pressing
court suits. They constituted the majority of the
states, and were the true fruits of the Commission's
labors. Maryland, which formerly selected its entire
delegation by state committee, resurrected its
presidential primary after an eight year interim.
Although the committee would continue to choose some
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of the delegates, they would be bound to the winner of
the statewide preference vote, composing in effect
a bound at large delegation. It was intended that
these appointments would be used to balance the
delegation with regard to race, age, and sex, if the
district delegates were unrepresentat ive
.
In 1968
the delegates from Rhode Island were named by a
nominating committee of the executive committee of
the state committee; in 1969 a primary was established
to elect delegates at the congressional district level.
Still other states, which already had reasonably
open and democratic systems made efforts to improve
upon them by incorporating those guidelines not
already in practice. Many convention states moved to
elect most of their delegates at the district level.
Presidential preference contests were established
in Florida and the District of Columbia where previously
there were none. Alabama was among the primary states
which moved to elect 75$> of their delegates at the
district level. "The move all but assures the inclusion
of blacks in the Alabama delegation. The absence of
blacks had brought seating challenges in 196^ and 1968.
This represented the latest in a series of reforms in
» ox
Alabama politics that began in 1969. In New York
the state committee voted to elect all of the state's
delegates by primary, abdicating its former role of
choosing one—third of the delegation. Commenting on
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this move, New York Times reporter Thomas Rowan said:
County leaders have had a major voice
in the choice of the at large delegation
named by the state committee in the past.
This group of delegates has usually included
these county chairmen, as well as the party's
elder statesmen and contributors of
substantial funds familiarly known as fatcats.
The power of the county leaders in the
selection of the at large delegation has, in
the opinion of the reformers, given them
undue influence in the choice of the president
and has led to repeated charges of bossism...
In 1968 McCarthy supporters walked out of a
s tate. comnii t tee meeting when they were only
given 15 of a total of 65 at large votes.
They argued that they were entitled to half
of the 65 votes because 62 or roughly half of
the 123 district delegates elected in the
primary were committed to McCarthy. 2**
The state committee’s action was calculated
to give the voters a greater degree of participation in
delegate selection and avoid the inner party strife
of 1968. However, despite their fights in the legislature
and in the courts, the reformers were unable to obtain
a statute allowing delegates to state their presidential
preference on the ballot. But since a good faitli effort
was made, New York was ultimately certified as being in
full compliance.
Massachusetts is another state whose primary
has undergone substantial changes since 1968. In
August 1969, a law was passed establishing an
Oregon type presidential preference contest with all
nationally recognized candidates being placed on the
ballot
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The legislature thereafter passed a bill to elect
80% of the delegates at the congressional district
level and only 20% at large. The existing set up was
almost exactly the opposite and gave to the state
committee great power over delegate selection in
that the committee slated the at large delegation.
Governor Francis Sargent, a Republican, vetoed the
bill in November 1971, however; and with time growing
short the committee amended its rules to incorporate
this provision, realizing that it was the only
alternative to a challenge. Then the legislature passed
a bill ending the winner take all provision, with the
statewide winner of the preference race now only
receiving the support of the at large delegates and the
district winners receiving the support of the district
delegates. In signing the law Sargent noted: "Any
candidate that has enough electoral support to win
a plurality in a political area as large as a
congressional district should be entitled to
representation at the convention."
States with convention systems were also among
those attempting to improve upon some practices of their
system which had left much to be desired in the areas
of openness and participation. In Maine for example,
delegates in 1968 were all elected at large by the
state convention on the basis of "recommendations" of
a nominating committee. This was amended so that they
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would be elected by the convention at the district
level by secret written ballot. 26 In Georgia,
whose anachronistic system was the most undemocratic,
allowing the governor to hand-pick the entire
delegation, a convention system was established
reaching down to the precinct level. Commenting on the
change, State Representative Julian Bond, upon election
as a state convention delegate, said: "In comparison
07
with the old way, its like going to the moon." 4'
A final group of states went beyond the required
guidelines of the Commission and implemented some
of the "recommended" proposals as well. Rather than
just adopting the established reform plan, they
demonstrated reform initiative by introducing some
novel and innovative concepts in delegate selection.
The chief experiment was that of proportional
representation at all levels of delegate selection.
Although this was a required guideline for convention
states, it was only optional for primary states. There
were a couple of primary states, however, which decided
to experiment with proportional representation.
New Mexico, which had previously chosen all of
its delegates at large in a state convention, in 1969
established the first primary to incorporate the
concept of proportional representation. It provided for
a presidential preference poll which would determine
the relative popularity of the candidates, and then the
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delegates would be distributed between the two leading
candidates in proportion to their share of the vote.
Hence if candidate X got 50$ and candidate Y got 25$
and there were thirty delegates, X would get twenty
and Y would get ten. In North Carolina a primary
was established which would divide the delegates
between all candidates receiving more than 15$ of the
preference vote. The delegates themselves would be
chosen at a later date by a series of precinct, county,
and state conventions.
Arizona, besides adopting proportional representation
for its convention also introduced another innovation
—
cumulative voting. Under this system each voter was
entitled to cast as many votes as there were delegates
to be elected, with the option of spreading the votes
out over the entire field or ’’bullet-voting" them all
for a few delegates. This was a further attempt to
diminish the front runner's advantage by allowing
less favored candidates to concentrate on winning a
few delegate posts which would normally be swept up
by the front runner.
THU CREDENTIALS CHAIRMAN
A final index of the importance accorded the
reforms and the seriousness with which their compliance
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would be pursued by the party hierarchy was provided
by the National Committee meeting of October 13
,
1971 .
This meeting had been called to select the temporary
Chairman of the Credentials Committee and served
to focus attention on the importance of the Commission's
enforcement power, or more properly, its lack of it.
The Commission was forced to rely upon the Credentials
Committee to decide delegate disputes and take corrective
action. Hence the Credentials Committee was the crucial
tribunal in upholding convention reform, and that was
why selection of its chairman took on additional
significance in October of 1971. The importance of the
Committee Chairman was that he would appoint the
hearing officers who would conduct delegate challenge
investigations; he would chair the Committee meetings
prior to the convention's opening; he would aid in
drawing up the final reports on challenges; and he
would establish the special procedural rules by which
to handle those challenged delegations selected less than
70 days prior to the convention's opening.
Reform elements in the National Committee backed
the candidacy of Senator Harold Hughes, but once again
he was vigorously opposed by the party regulars.
Chairman O'Brien put up his own hand-picked candidate,
Mrs. Patricia Harris. A black woman and a lawyer, she
had been an ambassador in the Johnson administration.
At the meeting, the reformers tried to offset her
two most obvious advantages— the fact that she was
both black and a woman— by having Representative
Shirley Chisholm nominate Senator Hughes. Labor
lobbyists countered with what Hughes decried as "savage
tactics". Many committeemen were warned that unless they
voted for Mrs. Harris, they could forget about AFL-CIO
money for their states’ congressional candidates.
Chairman O’Brien, however, was the most powerful
persuader. Hutting his prestige on the line, he
sought to turn the contest into a vote of confidence
in his leadership and threatened to resign if Mrs.
Harris lost. It was reported that his lobbying swung
at least ton votes in the last hours before the balloting,
Mrs. Harris won the post by a vote of 72-31; her
victory had been produced by a coalition of O'Brien,
the party hierarchy, the AFL-CIO operatives, and
ironically, the Southern bloc. When the balloting
was over, it was clear that the tenuous bonds which
had held the regulars and the reformers together for
so many months had become sorely strained. Many persons
felt that what the party had vowed would never happen
again, was already happening. William Shannon of
The New York Times somberly commented:
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There is little doubt that the
reformers represent the wave of the futurebut the Democrats can only be effective
if the reformers and the regulars are
reconciled, tvhat is apparently happening
is the beginning of a polarizing process
which proved fatal in 1968, Labor and
the party regulars are firmly arrayed on
one side while the militant reformers,
civil rights groups, and vouth are
digging in on the other. 2 9
This divisive meeting brought to the fore
much of the discontent that had been seething
below the surface. The reformers were livid at the
partisanship demonstrated by O'Brien, since the
party chairman traditionally took a neutral stance
in such intraparty fights. Many members likewise
resented the manner in which organized labor
denounced Hughes, despite his excellent pro-labor
voting record in the Senate. Many reformers were
concerned with the effect that this decision would
have on the successful implementation of the reform
program. They saw Mrs. Harris as part of the regulars'
attempt to sabotage the reform effort by not pressing
for full compliance in her role as Credentials Chairman.
The rebuff of Senator Hughes cast a shadow over the
future of the reform program, and the reformers
apprehensions were expressed by Nation magazine:
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Politically it is folly to adopt the
new rules and then at this late stage
raise doubts that they will be firmly
enforced. The issue of reform had been
resolved; now it may have been reopened. 0
By the end of 1971 then, party reform, despite
some criticism, had been accepted in principle by
most prominent Democrats, who had for the most part
cooperated with the Commission. Moreover, the party
hierarchy, particularly the National Committee, though
at first challenging the legitimacy of the Commission,
later acknowledged its autonomy, withdrew from
meddling in its affairs, and inserted its guidelines
into the 1972 Convention Call intact. Only one proposal,
the modified allocation formula, was challenged by
dissatisfied elements from both the left and right
wings of the party. This sole legal assault upon the
guidelines failed and the federal courts upheld the
formula. Finally, though state party organizations
were at first hesitant about implementing the reforms,
they later resigned themselves to the inevitable and
began to comply, albeit in varying degrees. Indeed,
about the only omen which appeared unfavorable to the
reform effort was the defeat of Senator Hughes for
the Credentials Committee Chairmanship. Thus, as the
nation entered the presidential election year of 1972,
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most Democrats felt confident that the party had
taken a great step forward. The events of 1968-1971
prompted Samuel Brightman, a former Deputy Chairman
of the National Committee, to write somewhat
prophetically:
The Democratic party has accepted
a set of top to bottom reforms that make
it the first truly democratic national
political organization in the nation’s
history. The reforms will undoubtedly
bring new life to a sagging two party
system. They may also cost the Democrats
a presidential victory in 1972... If all
this is not sincerely meant, it has fooled
me, and I have participated five times
in attempts to reform the method of
selecting delegates to the Democratic
convention. 31
CHAPTER IV
APPLICATION OF REFORM
Look at me—— I'm a man, I’m white,
I’m a Protestant, I’m over forty years old
and I make over $25,000 a year. Hell, I
shouldn't even b£ a delegate.
Lee Gaudineer
Iowa Delegate
Newsweek, June 26, 1972
DELEGATE SELECTION IN ACTION *
Selection of delegates to the 1972 Democratic
National Convention got underway in the latter part of
January with the Iowa precinct caucuses. These caucuses
were meetings open to all members of the party over 18,
held only after due public notice with the purpose of
selecting delegates to the state convention. It was at
these local meetings that proportional representation with
regard to minority candidate support would get its
first test. Since the same share of candidate strengtli
was passed on all along the line, it was possible to
roughly calculate how many national convention delegates
would go to whom as early as January. This contrasted
sharply with the practices of tiie past in which delegates
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would be slated by state party leaders and generally
kept in an uncommitted status until the national
convention. According to The New York Times* Warren
Weaver
:
Though mechanically different, this
roughly simulates a statewide poll of
Democrats as to their presidential
preference and is the equivalent of a
presidential primary a month and a half
before New Hampshire and affecting two
times as many delegates. 1
Also around this time, the precinct caucuses in
Arizona were being watched very closely by Democratic
politicians to see the effects not only of proportional
representation, but also of the cumulative voting
method discussed earlier. Organized labor leaders
ran uncommitted slates of delegates, seeking to retain
the massive power they formerly held. Before the
elections it was widely felt that by "bullet-voting"
they could pick up a sizeable amount of the state convention
delegates, perhaps as mucli as 30-^0%. When the returns
were in on January 30 however, only 17% of the 500
delegates were uncommitted and only a third of this 17%
represented organized labor. The large grassroots
turnout and "bullet-voting" for delegates pledged to
announced candidates combined to produce this result.
The results were viewed as a major setback for the
AFL-ClO’s national strategy of trying to elect non-aligned
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delegates to form a bargaining bloc at the national
convention. Arizona’s AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer
Darwin Aycock said that the results illustrated the
difficulty of trying to elect non-aligned delegates
over recognized candidates. "Let's face it, we lost.
Nobody wants to take the trouble to be uncorami t ted
anymore.'' Even Aycock lost his bid to become a state
2convention delegate. After the final state convention
on February 12, no one could argue that the Arizona
experience did not constitute a triumph for the party
reform movement.
In 19b0 one man picked the entire
slate; in 1968 a handfull of men drew
up the delegate list. In 1972 more than
35,000 Arizona Democrats voted in the
January caucuses; ^65 attended the state
convention, and the reforms worked.
3
In Georgia, formerly one of the most reactionary
of states, the reforms also worked well. Despite dire
predictions of lou turnout and high voter apathy, the
precinct meetings were well attended and over 300 people
competed for national convention delegate slots.
Delegate positions went to women, young persons, and
most astoundingly of all, to blades. In an Atlanta
district the state chairman, who under the old system
would have named the entire delegation in conjunction
with the governor, was himself defeated for a delegate
post by a black college junior. Lieutenant-Governor
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Lester Maddox charged that the participants in the
precinct caucuses were "Communis ts
,
anarchists.
Republicans, and ragtag bands from out of state."*1
Thus the man who four years earlier had virtually hand
picked the entire Georgia delegation was now reduced to
the role of a spectator on the sidelines.
By far the largest convention state, in fact the only
one of the ten largest states to employ the convention
method, was Texas. Because Texas was the state which had
led the fight for preservation of the unit rule at the
1968 convention, its 1972 state convention was watched
closely as it met on June 15 to name the 130 member
delegation.
The gathering was under the supervision of
convention manager Will Davis. As a member of the
McGovern Commission Mr. Davis had been the staunchest
regular on the panel, saying of the guidelines:
"I can't take this stuff back to Texas and sell it,
its totally unrealistic." Now however, Davis worked
feverishly to adhere to the guidelines and eliminate the
possibility of a challenge. He was praised by all factions
for his fairness and his hard work in trying to please
both reformers and regulars by his suggestions in
putting together the at— large delegation. The district
delegates had been apportioned as closely as possible
on the basis of demonstrated candidate support. Of the
at~large delegates, three posts went to gubernatorial
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candidate Dolph Briscoe and the two National Committee
members, and the other 27 slots were used to balance the
delegation with regard to age, race, and sex. After his
.job was finished, Davis said to an aide of Senator
McGovern: M Tell George it worked pretty well after all."'*
Much of Hie success of the reforms in the
convention states went unnoticed, inasmuch as most
of the nation’s attention was focused by the national
media on the primary states. With a record number of
contests slated to take place, the 1972 primaries were
portrayed by their supporters as providing an
unprecedented display of voter participation. It was
also claimed that they would provide a better chance
than ever for an accurate expression of voter preference
on candidates.
Toward the end of 1971, however, doubts were
raised as to whether the primaries would really be
given the opportunity to function as intended. In
many primary states party leaders were seen to be
moving in the direction of putting together slates
pledged to favorite son candidates. Though not expressly
banned by either the McGovern-Fraser or O'Hara Commissions,
favorite sons were definitely frowned upon by reformers
as part of the "old politics" approach of keeping
large blocs of delegates uncommitted in order to
obtain bargaining power at the convention, and in the
104
process denying the voters a meaningful expression
of their presidential preference. Among those
seriously contemplating favorite son candidacies were
Senator John Tunney of California, Senator Harrison
Williams of New Jersey, and Governor John Gilligan
of Ohio, Together their states controlled 533 votes,
or roughly a fifth of the total.
In addition, other states, such as Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania
,
and New York, reportedly were moving
toward some sort of "unity slate" composed of most of
the top ranking Democrats in the state. Instead of
being pledged to the candidacy of a favorite son, these
slates would run uncommitted, hut with the same
objectives in mind as the former group. As time passed,
criticism of these tactics mounted and when the uncommitted
slates in the early convention states faltered, most of
these plans were abandoned. No favorite son candidacies
emerged, and most of the unity slates that were eventually
formed pledged themselves to one of the declared
candidates. On the whole, the uncommitted slates which
did run in the primary states met with little success.
In New Jersey they won 28 of 109 slots; in Pennsylvania
12 of 135; in New York 17 of 248. The only primary
state which opted for an uncommitted bloc to a large
degree was Illinois with 97 of 160.
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In general, delegate selection procedures ran
smoothly in the months preceding the convention, and
the patchwork quilt process which had begun with
the Arizona and Iowa precinct caucuses in late
January ended with the Arkansas, Delaware, and
Washington state conventions on June 25
,
a fortnight
before the convention's opening. This five month
process selected the delegates who would cast the
3016 votes at the national convention.
CREDENTIALS CHALLENGES
It was at this point that the Credentials
Committee swung into action. The Committee was charged
with settling any disputes that arose as to the right
of a delegate to be seated by recommending to the
convention in its report who should be certified as
bona fide delegates.
The Credentials Committee procedures were run in
the following manner: as the states selected their
delegations, and as dissident elements announced their
intent to challenge the credentials of these delegations,
the Committee appointed a panel of hearing examiners to
investigate each case and prepare a fact finding report.
The full Committee then met in Washington for ten
days beginning on June 26. As the Committee took up
each case, it reviewed the examiner's report and
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recommendations, then debated the issue on both sides,
and finally voted which delegation, the one originally
chosen or that of the challengers, was to be certified
as a state's official delegation. The losers, provided
that they could muster 10% of the Committee's votes,
were permitted to appeal the ruling to the full
convention by filing a minority report seeking to
overturn the Committee's decision.
Due to the new delegate selection rules, many
bases for challenges surfaced. Indeed, the Credentials
Committee acted on a record number of cases— an
astonishing 82 suits involving 1289 delegates in
31 states and Puerto Rico, or roughly 40% of the
delegates. In often stormy sessions over a ten day
period, the Committee held hearings on all these
challenges and filed its report five days before the
opening of the convention. Throughout the meetings
most of the challenges were settled or dropped, and
the minority reports that were filed affected only
fifteen states. Of those that were appealed, only two
cases concerned such large blocs of votes and such
hotly contested issues as to merit detailed examination.
It has been my intent throughout this paper to
focus on the development and execution of the delegate
selection reform program without becoming involved
in the political aspects of the fight for t tic 1972
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Democratic presidential nomination. At this point,
however, the delegate challenge procedures became
enmeshed with political considerations and personalities.
Since a full and accurate description of the former
is impossible without reference to the latter, it is
necessary to enter, however gingerly, the political
thicket of June, 1972.
One such challenge was to the California delegation.
On June 6 Senator George McGovern won the California
primary with of the vote, yet was awarded all 271
of the state’s delegates in accordance with the winner
take all system. Soon thereafter the losers of the primary
jointly filed a challenge wit
f
h the Credentials Committee
seeking to apportion the delegates among all the candidates
on the basis of popular vote received, charging that a
winner take all system violated the reform rules.
Opponents of the challenge argued that abolition of
winner take all, though debated by the Reform Commission,
was defeated 13-3 and was only one of the recommended
guidelines. They also pointed out that winner take all
was in accordance with California state law, that both
Reform Commission Chairman Fraser and National Committee
Chairman O’Brien had certified the California state party
as being in full compliance with the party's guidelines,
/
and that the participants in the primary had agreed
to the winner take all principle in advance of the primary.
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On this basis, the hearing examiner for the California
case, a former Assistant Attorney General, Burke
Marshall, ruled on June 27 against the challengers
and recommended that the original 271 delegates elected
in the primary be certified.
The full Committee took up the challenge on
June 29, but some backstage maneuverings had already
determined the outcome. A coalition of organized labor
and supporters of the candidates who had been defeated
in the California contest had worked for weeJcs at
getting persons sympathetic to their cause appointed to
the Credentials Committee. Thus the Committee had
many members who were determined to stop McGovern
from getting the nomination by denying him 151 of the
California delegates. In Ohio, McGovern had lost the
primary by only 2# of the vote, yet all six Credentials
Committee members were opposed to him. In Texas, where
McGovern had won 34 of 130 delegates, all five members
of the Committee were hostile. In Minnesota, McGovern
forces controlled a third of the delegates, yet none of
the Committee votes. Thus with the ten California
members unable to vote on their state's challenge, the
vote was 72-66 against the examiner's report and in
favor of apportioning the delegates on the basis of
proportional representation. Immediately a minority
report was filed recommending the seating of all 271
delegates elected in the primary, and a bitter battle
was in the offing.
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The squabble first went to the courts where the
challengers argued that it was not in the Credentials
Committee’s power to change state law, especially after
the primary had been held. Federal District Court Judge
George Hart, though warning that the judiciary should not
become involved in Democratic party disputes, in effect
upheld the Credentials Committee action saying that it
did not violate the cons titut ional rights of the delegates.^
This decision was taken to the Circuit Court of
Appeals in Washington D.C. which held an extraordinary
July k session. The next day in a two-to-one decision
it overturned the District Court’s ruling, reinstated
the elected delegates, and stated that their expulsion
"was inconsistent with the fundamental principles of
due process" as laid down in the Constitution. It further
ruled that the Committee action had been "arbitrary and
unconstitutional." This was contrary to Judge Hart’s
O
finding that no constitutional issues were involved.
The anti-McGovern forces then appealed this ruling
to the Supreme Court a brief three days before the
opening of the convention. On July 7 the Supreme Court
on a 6-3 vote stayed the order of the Appeals Court which
had reseated the 271 delegates elected on June 6.
Technically the court itself took no action on the
challenge, ruling that the national convention was the
sole arbiter of its membership and should not be denied
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"its traditional powers to pass on the credentials of
the California delegates in question." The court also
criticized the Circuit Court decision, noting the
absence of legal precedent supporting the court's action
"in intervening in the internal determinations of a
national political party on the eve of its convention." ^
The net result of the legal arguments which had
run the gamut of District Court to the Supreme Court in
only five days, was to leave unchanged the Credentials
Committee decision unseating 151 of McGovern's California
delegates elected in the primary and apportioning them
to the other candidates on the basis of proportional
representation. The stage was now set for a showdown
vote on the convention floor.
The second case testing the vitality of the reform
procedures was that of Illinois. In the March 21 primary
59 uncommitted delegates were elected from the congressional
districts comprising the city of Chicago. This slate
was composed in part of Chicago Mayor Richard Daley and
some 35 ward committeemen, and it contained only 6
women, 12 blacks, and 8 young persons, grossly
underrepresenting their numbers in the Chicago population.
No open caucuses had been held to choose these delegates
since they had been secretly slated by the Cook County
Democratic organization headed by Mayor Daley.
Furthermore, Daley ordered city and county party officials
Ill
to publish and distribute sample ballots which only
contained the names of the organization-sanctioned
slate. Maverick Chicago Alderman Seymour Simon balked
at distributing the ballots in his district, arguing that
it was totally unethical for the official party
apparatus to take sides in an intraparty primary contest.
Simon disclosed that he heard the Mayor instruot
precinct workers to distribute the ballots saying that
he "didn't give a damn" about the new party rules and
that once his delegates were seated at the convention
no one "would dare" throw them out.*^
Meanwhile, a group headed by Chicago Alderman
William Singer had filed a challenge and had named an
alternate slate in a series of congressional district
caucuses. This incensed the Daley people who without
waiting for resolution by the Credentials Committee,
took the case to court. On June 19 Federal Judge
George Hart upheld the Daley contention that persons
forming a slate have the right to include on it whomever
they wish, and that such a slate may not be barred
from the convention because of imbalance on the basis
of age, race, or sex, if it was elected in an open
election. This ruling was a bombshell because of its
wider ramifications: it emphatically struck down the
Reform Commission guidelines requiring fair representation
of women, minorities, and young people on state
delegations. This was the severest test that reform
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advocates had encountered since the apportionment
battles of 1971, and the National Committee sought
to counter the blow by appealing the ruling.
The next day a Federal Appeals Court in Washington
D.C. overturned Judge Hart's decision by ruling that
"the regulations in question did not present sufficient
likelihood of injury to the constitutional rights"
of the Daley delegation to warrant action by the courts
prior to actions taken by the Credentials Committee. 11
The Court's ruling reinforced the right of the Credentials
Committee to require adequate representation of
minorities on delegate slates.
Meanwhile, the Credentials Committee had already
begun its investigation into the Chicago challenge.
The investigatory meetings in Chicago were loud and
raucus affairs; the first hearing examiner was subjected
to such bitter personal attack that he resigned. lie was
replaced by Cecil Poole, former U.S. Attorney for San
Francisco. The following provides an example of the
stormy meetings over which Poole presided:
Fifteen aldermen and ward committeemen
were in the room at once. The city council
meeting was adjourned early so that they
could attend .... During seven hours of delaying
tactics Poole overruled 22 motions to
suspend the hearings on the spot. At one
point Alderman lveane, the Mayor's floor
leader, called the whole proceding a
kangaroo court. 'Shut off his mike,' advised
black AlderwToman Langford, a member of the
Challengers who lias often experienced
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similar tactics at the hands of Keane
in the city council chambers
. .
. Challengers
filed 100 affidavits attesting organizational
involvement in preparing and distributing
sample ballots— a violation of the guideline
on strict neutrality. One witness for the
challengers, a past President of the League
of Women Voters, testified that when a
precinct captain delivered the slate of
official candidates to her door, she
complained about the absence of women.
' Women don’t belong in politics.’ was the
answer that she received. 12
At the end of these meetings Poole ruled in
favor of seating the challengers, stating that the
Daley slate was guilty of "deliberate and calculated"
violations of the reform rules.
The full Credentials Committee met to discuss
the Chicago challenge on June 30, the day after its
California ruling. The McGovern supporters were
still furious over what they termed the California
"steal", and were bent on getting revenge. Poole’s
report upheld the charges that the Daley slate was
composed in secret caucuses, underrepresented women,
blacks, and young people, and was openly promoted
by the official party apparatus prior to the primary
election. The Daley people argued that their slate,
having been duly elected by the voters of Chicago
while the challengers were put together by small party
caucuses, was therefore the only slate legally
mandated to represent the people of Chicago.
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For many
,
the crux of the matter was summed up bv
Matthew Troy, the Democratic Chairman of New York’s
Queens County; "Dither we’re going to be a party with
rules for everyone, or we’re going to be a party with
rules for everyone but Richard J. Daley. Now the
tables were reversed; the 10 pro-McGovern California
members were able to vote, but the 6 anti-McGovern
Illinois members were not. When the vote was taken,
Mayor Daley and the other 58 members of his slate
were ousted in favor of the challengers on a 71-61 vote.
The Daley forces then again turned to the courts to
seek a more favorable ruling. With the case again
before Judge Hart, representatives of the Credentials
Committee in answering Daley's contention that they had
no right to overturn the results of Illinois election
laws, argued that they had the final power to decide
whether delegates elected under state law were qualified
to sit at the convention. Judge Hart ruled against the
Daley slate by holding that the Credentials Committee
was in its rights in rejecting the slate for violating
. 1
4
the party reform rule on slate-making.
The Mayor’s slate appealed the ruling but it was
upheld by the Appeals Court which struck down Daley's
notion that the rules constituted a quota system. The
Court held that all the rules required was that affirmative
actions be taken by the states to undo the discrimination
of the past. It pointed out that the Credentials
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Committee had seated Hawaii with only two women out of
twenty delegates, and Connecticut with only two youths
out of fifty-one. When the Supreme Court refused to
intervene, the Credentials Committee action was left
unchanged and Daley's last recourse was an appeal
to the convention floor.
The Credentials Committee hearings from June 26-
July 5 were an extremely important stage in determining
the ultimate enforcement of the reform program. Though
bitter, stormy, and controversial, the hearings were
generally successful in upholding the spirit and letter
of the guidelines. The reformers' apprehens ions about
Mrs. Harris proved to be without rational basis, for she
was highly praised by all factions for her efficiency and
for her fair rulings from the chair. The Committee did
little to undo the states' efforts as most of the suits
were dropped or settled in favor of the original group.
Of the 27 cases which had a hearing before the full
Committee, of the original delegations were seated,
7 were settled by compromise, and only 6 sets of
challengers were seated, (see Table 1^) The only major
case in which the hearing examiner's report was overturned
was in California, where raw political realities
overrode all other considerations. With the preliminaries
of the Credentials Committee and the courts now aside,
the stage was set for tiie opening of the Democratic
party's 36 th National Convention.
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TABLE 14
*
Credentials Committee Action
Challenge
Original
Delegates Settled by Challengers
Withdrawn Seated Compromise Seated
Ind. *Ala. La
.
*Cal
.
Iowa Alas
.
Md. *Ga,
Me. *Conn *Mo. *111.
N.Y. Fla. N.J. *Mich.
N.D. *llaw
.
*Okla. Miss,
*Ky
.
Nev.
N.C.
*S.C.
Tenn.
*Tex.
Vt.
*Wash.
*R. I
.
*Va.
Penn.
Puerto Rico
An asterisk beside the name of a state denotes that a
minority report was filed to appeal the Credentials
Committee action to the full convention membership.
Table 14 was compiled by the author from information
found in the following sources:
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
,
July 1, 1972, p.1572.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
,
July 8, 1972, p.l640.
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THE NATIONAL CONVENTION
As the convention opened, political prognosticators
looked back over the long months of delegate selection
procedures — the conventions, the primaries, the
challenges, the hearings, the Committee votes and the
court fights— and somberly forecast a party brawl
of unequaled magnitude. Others however were far
happier with the delegate selection processes that they
had witnessed, and far more optimistic as to the
convention results. Among these was the famous
presidential scholar, James MacGregor Burns, who was
most impressed with the dedication of young Democrats:
The Democratic party seems about to
embark on one of the biggest, boldest, and
riskiest ventures in its long history. It
is about to realize a dream. .. Urged to work
within the system, young people have done
so with predictable passion and persistence,
and unpredictable finesse and sophistication.
They have shown a mastery of both the new
politics of media and message, and the old
politics of reaching, canvassing, and delivering
voters to the polls. Some of the most important
smoke filled rooms of 1972 have been run not
by old time bosses, but by young persons
expert in caucus politics.
.
.Thus the Democrats
are on the eve of a series of decisions
which could alter the shape of the nation’s
politics for many years to come.l6
And so the Democratic National Convention opened
on Monday, July 10, in a hopeful atmosphere despite
some dire predictions of a bitterly divisive first
session. After the opening amenities and welcoming
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speeches had been dispensed with, the remainder of
the Monday night session was devoted exclusively to
consideration of the Credentials Committee report. The
minority reports that had been filed and were now
scheduled for floor action involved fifteen states,
and again we shall concentrate our attention on the
two most important.
At the rostrum Mrs. Harris got matters underway
with an announcement that the challenges to Hawaii,
Kentucky, and Virginia had been withdrawn. The challenges
to South Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia preceded the
California contest which did not begin until midnight.
When the debate started, the same arguments were
repeated: opponents of the minority report argued that
winner take all flew in the face of party reforms;
proponents stated that winner take all had been
sanctioned by the Reform Commission, the National
Committee, and the state of California, and that there
was no basis for overturning it at that late stage.
Ironically, the debate found the liberal reformers
battling for the status quo of winner take all, and the
party regulars demanding reform through proportional
representation. When the question was put to a roll call
vote around 1:00 A.M., the minority report was accepted
by a decisive 1618-1238 and the 271 delegates originally
elected in the June 6 primary were finally seated as
* 17delegates.
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At 2:00 A.M. the convention took up the Chicago
challenge. Mayor Daley's slate had been rebuffed by
every tribunal which had reviewed its case— the
hearing examiner, the Credentials Committee, the
Federal District and Appeals Courts. Now Daley's last
hurrah was to be acted out on the convention floor,
although for a moment it appeared that political
considerations might yet intervene and save him. The
McGovern forces, now confident of the nomination, did
not want to risk losing Illinois in November by further
alienating Daley. A compromise settlement was thus
worked out by which both the Daley group and the
challengers would be seated with a half-vote apiece.
Many in the McGovern camp were still bitter toward the
Mayor for his open contempt of the reform rules and
felt that this action could not go unpunished. Their
position was again summed up by Queens County Chairman
Matt Troy: "I broke my back trying to conform to these
rules, and I'll be damned if I am going to let Daley
get away with ignoring the rules and doing things
his way!
The Mayor and his supporters were also less than
enthusiastic about settling for half a loaf at this
late stage, and so when a motion to suspend the rules in
order to bring up the compromise solution was offered,
it mustered a bare majority of 1485-iAll but failed to
reach the necessary two-thirds vote. On the following
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roll call the Credentials Committee report was upheld
by a vote of 1486-1371. Thus Mayor Daley, a fixture at
Democratic conventions since 1924 and Chairman of the
Illinois delegation since 1956, was excluded from
participation in the 1972 convention because of his
flagrant violations of the party reform guidelines.
At 4:45 after the Chicago decision, Mrs. Harris
announced that the remaining challenges in Connecticut,
Missouri, Michigan, Oklahoma, Texas, Rhode Island,
and Washington had been withdrawn. The report of the
Credentials Committee, which had in most cases upheld
the Reform Commission guidelines, was thereupon
approved overwhelmingly.
After the Monday night session had determined the
final roster of delegates, the convention settled
down and transacted its business— the drafting of the
platform and the nomination of the presidential and
vice-presidential candidates. After having traced the
reform program for four years and having observed the
delegate selection process develop, one could not help
but feel a sense of anticlimax after the crucial
Monday night session. This marathon session had culminated
nearly four years of hard work aimed at making the
Democratic party truly democratic. As the post-mortems
on the convention came in, most were rather laudatory of
the commendable job done on the reform program. One such
analysis was written by the eminent legal scholar,
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Alexander Bikel, Professor of Law at Yale University:
People feared that the Commission's new
requirements would be imposed on the delegate
selection procedure, the state parties woiild
not yield to them, and the 1972 convention
would be a shambles of credentials challenges
and little else. It isn't turning out that
badly after all. Delegate selection has
undergone quite a change as a result of more
widespread and genuine compliance by state
parties than even the most sanguine reformer
would have permitted himself to expect back
in 1969 . Silent, absent, or just plain tired
potential majorities do no better under the
reformed process than they did before. But
vigorous, intense partisans can find their way
in, and if not met by equal vigor and intensity
on the other side, they prevail . That ' s democracy,
and its better than no democracy. If the
previously established leaders of the party
want to recapture it, they'll have to hustle,
and if they hustle, maybe they can....
The danger to the survival of the
Democratic party has come not, as feared, from
enforcement of new rules of delegate selection,
but from a lawless attempt to override them in
the California case .... There is wholly
convincing evidence that the 1968 convention
never intended to decree the abolition of the
California primary, and there is absolutely
conclusive— and uncontroverted— evidence
that neither did the Commission. ... The trouble
with the Daley group is too bad. But the party
will in the long run be strengthened by the
decision in the Daley case, as any institution
is strengthened which visibly and painfully
submits itself to the process of law, and
obeys the rules it has made for its own
governance . *9
CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS OF REFORM
For too long now we have viewed our
parties as private affairs— the property
of the bosses, the large contributors, and
the incumbent politicians. But tilings are
changing
... We arc in the process of
reinvigorating our party with a massive
injection of democracy. The day of the
bosses is all but over. My optimism may be
premature, but I do not think that there
will be another Chicago.
Senator George McGovern
Harper's Magazine, January, 1970
PRAISE AND POSITIVE EFFECTS
Almost as soon as the 1972 Democratic National
Convention adjourned and passed into history, it
became clear that it would become one of the most
talked about and written about conventions in recent
memory. The factor differentiating it from past
Democratic conventions was its sheer novelty— truly
it was unlike any convention the party had ever before
witnessed. The roots of this metamorphosis have been
examined in the previous chapters. We have seen the
irregularities and abuses which existed in the dclegat
selection process as it functioned in 1968; we have
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traced the development and implementation of the
reform program aimed at correcting that situation; and
vre have investigated the functioning of the reform
processes throughout 1972. I now propose to conclude
this study by looking at the results which the reform
program produced in the convention system, and by
drawing some conclusions as to their effectiveness
and merit.
The first result produced by the reform effort
was the increased democratization of the delegate
selection processes employed by the states. As pointed
out in the first chapter, one of the principle aims
of the reform program was to restore to the selection
procedures the long absent spirit of participatory
democracy. By further opening the selection process
to the rank and file and by eliminating closed and
1
undemocratic procedures, the reforms progressed
substantially toward this goal.
Their efforts in this regard are evidenced by
the remarkable alteration in the delegate selection
procedures of certain states. The six states which in
1968 appointed their delegations by state committee
—
Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, and
Rhode Island— by 1972 had abandoned this method in
favor of either the primary or convention method.
Other states also cut back on the discretionary powers
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of their state committees, paring their delegate
selection involvement down to the 10$ maximum
consistent with the Commission guidelines and in
most cases binding the committee selected delegates to
the presidential preferences as expressed by the
state convention or primary results. Another step
toward more direct participation by the rank and file
was taken by the establishment of new primaries in six
states— Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Rhode Island and Tennessee— thus bringing the total
number of primary states to 22 as compared with 16 in
1968
.
(see Table 15) In addition, it should be pointed
out that the primary states in 1972 selected 65 . 5$ of the
total number of delegates as compared with 40.7$ in 1968
.
This was indeed an impressive increase. (Compare Table
16 with Table 2 on page 22 )
The distribution of the new primaries was also
important. The establishment of primaries in North
Carolina and Tennessee together with the strengthening
of the Florida primary gave the South some additional
weight along the primary trail. As R. W. Apple of The
New York Times noted:
They may force some Democratic contenders
to campaign in these Southern states, and they
might give an additional lift to more
conservative candidates. Now the South for the
first time in decades may play a major role
in pre-convention campaigning. 1
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TABLE 15
*
Delegates Selected by Primaries and Conventions, 1972
Primary States Convention States
Ala. 37 Alas
.
10
Cal. 271 Ark. 27
Fla. 81 Ariz. 25
111. 170 Colo 36
Ind. 76 Conn. 51
Md. 53 Del. 13
Mass
.
102 Geo
.
53
Mich 132 Ilaw. 17
Neb. 24 Ida. 17
N.Ii. 18 Iowa 46
N.J. 109 Kans 35
N.M. 18 Ky. 57
N.Y. 278 La* 44
N.C. 64 Me
.
20
Ohio 153 Minn 64
Penn. 182 Miss. 25
Ore
.
34 Mo. 73
It. I. 22 Mont 17
Tenn 49 Nev. 11
W.Va.
.
35 N.D. 14
Wise. 67 Ok la. 39
S.L). 17 s.c. 32
2007 Tex. 130
Utah 19
vt. 12
Va. 53
Wash
.
52
V/yo. 11
1009
*
Newsweek, April 3, 1972, p . 21
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TABLE 16*
Percentage
Primary or
of Delegates Selected by Either
State Convention Methods, 1972
*
Table 16 was
data provided
compiled by the
in Table 15.
author from the raw
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Apple’s analysis proved correct as the Florida primary
turned out to be one of the more important early testing
grounds for the presidential contenders, and together
with the other Southern contests richly rewarded
Governor George Wallace with delegates. The reforms
also extended to the voters of the Southern states
the right to vote on their presidential preference, a
right which in many cases had been denied them by
autocratic party leaders.
Besides expanding the number of primaries, popular
part ic i pat i on and influence was extended through
various other changes. In convention states, the
abolition of the unit rule at all levels of the delegate
selection process must certainly rank as one of the
most fundamental changes ever made in the parly’s long
history. This rule had for decades suffocated minority
candidate support. Forced to vote for the candidate
supported by the majority of the delegation, delegates
often found themselves voting against their stated
preference. Now the voters were assured that all
significant candidate preferences would be given fair
representation throughout the selection process.
The guideline calling for all delegate selection
meetings to be well publicized and open to all Democrats
was a great aid in enabling more party members than
ever before to attend party caucuses, particularly at
the precinct level. The necessity of having written
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party rules together with the abolition of such
practices as proxy voting and minimal quorum
requirements assured that such meetings would not be
controlled by only a small clique— of any ideological
persuasion.
As the reforms thus returned more power and
influence over delegate selection to the voters at
the grass roots level, organized party machines were
weakened proportionally. Throughout the nation, machines
which had been grinding on for decades— in New Jersey,
in Pennsylvania, in Ohio, in Texas— were shut down
by the new reform rules. In Georgia and Louisiana, the
former omnipotence of the governor and state chairman
has been superceded by the precinct voters. Mayor Daley’s
Chicago organization, the one large big city machine
which elected to oppose the reforms, lost its fight
and was ignominiously excluded from the convention.
Thus the guidelines have unquestionably extended to the
rank and file increased access to and influence over
the delegate selection process.
A second effect of the reforms was to alter the
composition of the participants in the delegate
selection process. By easing registration barriers,
lowering prohibitive costs and fees, and prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or age, the
reforms involved in the selection process many people
who until 1972 had been excluded. Much as abolition of
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the poll tax had encouraged the financially under-
privileged to vote, the lowering or abolition of party
fees and assessments was aimed at bringing these
people into the party's delegate selection process.
This conscious attempt to expand and broaden the type
of people involved in party affairs was most noticeable
in the case of youth. In 1968 a large contingent of
young people had worked for the candidacies of Senators
Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, but had not been
allowed to express their presidential preference or
to vote for delegates in primaries or state conventions.
By 1972 they were armed with the vote and were encouraged
by the reforms to participate actively not only in the
general election, but also in intraparty affairs such as
delegate selection primaries, caucuses, and conventions.
A change in the composition of those charged with
selecting the delegates logically implies a change in
the makeup of the delegations themselves. For better or
for worse, this was the area in which most of the attention
to the reforms was focused both during the delegate
selection phase and at the convention itself. No other
data testify so clearly as to the success of the reforms
in opening the Democratic convention to previously
excluded groups as do the figures on delegate composition.
(Compare Table 17 with Tables 3 and on pages 30 and 32)
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TABLE 17
*
Percentages of Women, Youths, and Blacks Serving asDelegates to the 1972 Democratic National Convention
Percent of
State Women
Ala. 32.0
Alas
.
33.3
Ariz. 32.0
Ark. 44.4
Cal. 47.6
Colo. 50.0
Conn. 29.4
Del. 45.0
Fla. 41.7
Ga
.
30.2
Haw. 20.0
Ida. 35.0
111. 35.1
Ind. 35.5
Iowa 41.3
1
Kans 40.0
Ky. 42.6
La, 32.6
Me. 25.0
Md. 26.8
Mass 48.0
Mich. 43.7
Minn. 46.9
Mo. 38.8
Mont 45.0
Neh
.
45.8
Miss 44.0
Percent of
Youths
Percent
Blacks
10.8 27.0
28.6 9.5
44.0 12.0
18.5 18.5
34.7 18.5
33.3 13.9
4.0 7.9
10.0 15.0
17.3 13.6
20.8 34.0
20.0 0.0
15.0 10,0
18.6 15.0
17.1 15.7
15.2 9.0
22.8 11.4
21.3 10.6
21.7 41.3
25.0 0.0
16.1 16.1
19.4 10.8
20.4 21.1
18.6 9.4
9.4 10.6
35.0 5.0
29.2 4.2
32.0 56.0
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State
Percent of
Women
Percent of
Youths
Percent of
Blacks
Nev. 40.0 30.0 10.0
N.H. 40.0 15.0 0.0
N.J. 43.1 25.9 19.0
N.M. 40.0 25.0 5.0
N.Y. 48.9 25.2 12.6
N.C. 46.9 7.8 20.3
N.D. 40.0 25.0 5.0
Ohio 36.6 11.8 17.6
Okla. 43.9 9.8 9.8
Ore
.
50.0 38.2 5.9
Penn. 34.4 13.5 11.0
R.I. 31.0 37.9 6.9
S.C. 25.0 15.6 34.4
S.D. 41.2 35.3 0.0
Tenn. 49.0 30.6 32.7
Tex. 30.0 22.3 9.2
Utah 36.8 15.8 0.0
vt. 40.0 40.0 5.0
Va. 37.5 35.7 28.6
Wash. 38.5 13.5 7.7
W. Va. 5.7 5.7 0.0
Wise. 46.3 31.3 7.5
Wyo. 35.0 5.0 5.0
D.C. 45.0 20.0 70.0
Congressional Quarterly
,
July 8 1972, p. 1642
.
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For titty years after attaining the right to vote
women were not considered sophisticated enough
politically to participate in national conventions on
a par with men. The delegates to the 1972 convention
changed this however, as they included about 40$ women—
an Increase of almost 300$ over 1968 and far closer to
their goal of 50$ than most persons thought possible.
Led by female personalities such as Shirley MacLaine,
Gloria Steinem, Bella Abzug, and Shirley Chisholm,
the women delegates to the 1972 convention were often
vocal and always conspicuous. Likewise, young persons
had never played much of a role in institutionalized
party politics; but in 1972 the percentage of delegates
between 18 and 30 years of age reached 23$, skyrocketing
from the 3$ of 1968.
For years of course, the vanguard of the movement
for elimination of discrimination in all party affairs
had been black persons. Some of the stormiest credentials
fights of the past two decades had involved the right
of blacks to be seated as delegates. In 1972 the years
of struggle were brought to a climax when blacks
attained 15$ of the convention seats— almost triple the
5.5$ held in 1968, and actually giving them an
overrepresentation of their 11$ of the population.
In addition, other racial minorities such as Puerto Ricans,
Mexican-Americans
,
and American-Indians greatly increased
their representation in states in which their large
numbers had previously been ignored.
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Never before had a national convention been so
successful in involving such great numbers of previously
excluded segments of the population. In 1968 it was
precisely the suppression and exclusion of the views of
certain of these groups which in part contributed to their
venting their frustrations outside the convention hall.
In 1972, while there were some skirmishes within the
convention, the streets were quiet.
Because of this huge influx of new delegates who
had never before participated in a national convention,
the novice rate was phenomenal. First time delegates
accounted for nearly 80% of the total, and this was
by far the highest turnover ever recorded, (see Table 18)
Tied in with this record turnover was a sharp decline in
the number of high ranking Democratic politicians
attending the convention as delegates. One index of
this trend was the precipitate drop in the number of
Democratic members of Congress serving as delegates. As
a matter of fact, Congressional participation was more
than halved between 1908 and 1972. Only 19 Senators
and 49 House members were convention delegates.
(see Table 19)
In part this was due to the reform guideline
barring ex-officio delegates from being named. In the
past, Senators, Governors, Congressmen, Mayors, State
Chairmen, and National Committee members were quite often
entitled to automatic seats in their states' delegations.
135
TABLE 18
*
Percentage of First Time Delegates at Democratic Conventions
1944-1972
Year Percent
1944 69.0$
1948 64.1$
1952 67 . 2$
1956 67.3$
I960 58.4$
1964 53 . 5%
1968 62.7$
1972 80.0$
r
Donald Matthews, (ed. ) Perspectives on Presidential
Selection (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1972),
pp. 148-149.
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TABLE 19*
Percentage of Democratic Congressmen Serving as
Delegates to Democratic National Conventions, 1948-1972
Year
Percent of
Senators
Percent of
Representatives
1948 57.8% 15.1#
1952 76.0% 18.1%
1956 69.4% 28.1%
I960 n. a. n. a.
1964 n. a. n. a.
1968 63.5# 35.1#
1972 30.9# 14.1%
n. a.= not available
Donald Matthews, (ed. ) Persncc t ives on Presidential
Selection (Washington D.C.l Brookings Institute), 17756.
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Under the reformed procedures, however, they had to be
selected as delegates by a party primary, convention,
or committee. However, barring automatic delegates
per se was only half the reason for the few numbers of
political notables serving as delegates; the rest of the
answer was provided in an essay by Paul Wieck;
Some politicians who wanted to be there
as delegates weren't able to attend as delegates
for a classical political reason— they bet on
the wrong horse. A number of governors, senators,
and representatives signed up early with the
Muskie campaign and went down with it— Fell,
Pastore, O'Neill, White, Gi 1 1 igan
. . .
. The
McGovern group went all out to make it possible
for as many identifiable party figures as
possible to save face and go to Miami— Senator
Moss and Governor Hampton in Utah, Senator
Montoya in New Mexico, and Senators Tunney and
Cranston in Calif ornia. ... Still
,
a lot of
senators and representatives are not delegates.
Why? In case after case they declined to seek
delegate slots for practical political reasons.
Particularly in primary states where their
constituents were apt to be sharply divided
over candidate preferences, they did not want
to choose sides and alienate large blocs of
voters. Many tried the uncommitted route and
lost. Others sought appointment to the at large
slots, but fell prey to sex balancing.^
Thus many party notables were denied convention
seats not because they were barred by the guidelines,
but because they chose not to run for delegate positions
or they ran for them and were beaten. Thus those who
claimed that the guidelines were aimed at deliberately
disenfranchising the party leaders and stripping them
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of their rightful places as convention delegates were
off the mark considerably. This point was underscored in
a very perceptive article by David Broder of The
Washington Post:
The
seen the
1972 convention is
exclusion of party
officials, and their allies
supposed to have
regulars, elected
in organized labor
by a band of "new politics" zealots who
manipulated the rules from beginning to end to
nominate George McGovern. It is a comforting myth
to those who lost... But the key to the 1972
convention lay not in rules manipulations, but in
two independent fac tors ... One was the collapse of
Edmund Muskie, the front runner for the nomination,
and the consequent derailment of the vehicle on
which most of the party regulars and elected
officials had expected to ride to Miami... The
other factor was the inability of George Meany to
pick a candidate to back
Meany declined to choose
and "Scoop" Jackson. Not
in the early going...
among Muskie, Humphrey,
until the California
primary, when it was too late, did the AFL-CIO
come in full force behind Humphrey ... Even with
the handicaps of Muslcie' s collapse and labor's
indecision, the "regulars" very nearly triumphed.
The key vote of the convention, on the California
credentials challenge, was decided by only 173
votes— hardly evidence that the losers had been
excluded ... llad Muskie not collapsed, and bad
Meany not hesitated too long in making his choice,
far fewer party and elected officials and their
labor allies would have found themselves on the
outside looking in at Miami Beach.
3
From the standpoint of nomination strategies
employed by various groups then, the reforms also
played a part. With more open procedures, and with more
people than ever before able to express their choices,
the former strategy of sending huge blocs of uncommitted
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votes to the convention crumbled. For politicians, for
party leaders, and for labor leaders, this meant that
in order to exert their influence to the fullest, they
had to settle on one of the declared candidates earlier
and support him fully. Moreover, save for one or two
small pockets of votes, no favorite son candidacies
emerged in 1972— thus eliminating the old tactics of
brokering for the support of these blocs. The reforms
thus allowed a greater number of people a greater
voice in making a meaningful expression of their
presidential choice among the serious contenders for
the nomination.
With so many novices attending the convention
and so many credentials challenges slated, some persons
predicted a riotous and uncontrollable convention.
This was not the case, however, as even the Monday
night session was unusually placid given the usual
wranglings at Democratic conventions. From Tuesday on,
the convention came into sharp contrast with the 1968
fiasco and earned itself much praise. The following
editorial was run by The New York Times after the
convention’s adjournment.
The convention did credit to the
Democratic party. The decorum and attention
to business of the overwhelming number of
delegates— neophytes though they were— made
this convention unique in American politics.
This was indeed a democratic convention,
usually disciplined, always orderly, but
never bossed.
^
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Most of the credit for this success of course
belonged to the delegates who made up the convention.
Before the convention had opened, many people had
envisioned the hall filled with 1968-type protesters,
anarchists, nihilists, and rabble rousers, all bent on
turning the convention upside-down and foisting upon it
an extremist platform. As the convention progressed,
however, quite another image developed. Most of the
delegates, even the youngest and the most militant,
were kept under control at all times. Except for an
occasional outburst of emotion, the delegates maintained
their composure. All the radical platform planks such
as legalization of marijuana ,and of homosexuality,
though allowed to be fully debated, were soundly defeated.
Most of the delegates displayed dedication and discipline,
sitting through sessions which ran from 7 P.M. till 4 or
6 A.M. Commenting on the behavior of these delegates
Tom Wicker of The New York Times said:
If there is anything more striking here
than the decorum and industry of the reformed
delegates it is that these new political
leaders have shown themselves smart, tough, and
pragmatic, as people who manage a presidential
nomination always have to be, while the old
pros with few’ exceptions bumbled and fumbled...
But if its hardworking attitude has
distinguished this Democratic gathering from
the boozy, blowhard, unruly sessions of years
gone by, with their delays and confusions, there
has been no lack of the political professionalism
that the old party wheelhorses used to think
belonged exclusively to them.
5
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Aside from the delegates chosen under the new
rules, assessments were also made of the rules
themselves and how well they performed their tasks.
The results of the reform effort were, on the whole,
well received by observers of the convention proceedings.
The great majority of the reforms enacted were aimed
at correcting procedural wrongs which by anyone's
standards should have been eliminated long ago. Most
of the reforms were accepted by all factions of the
party, regulars included, as being right, just, and
long overdue. Theodore White brought this out very
well in the following passage;
It was wrong, flatly wrong, that a single
governor and state chairman could, as they did
in two Southern states, name the entire state
delegation to the national convention. It was
wrong, flatly wrong, that the delegate selection
process should begin in the ward politics of some
states— as in Massachusetts— fully three years
before the presidential campaign, before anyone
knew what the issues (and who the candidates)
might be. Proxy voting was wrong— a system
under which, when a caucus was called, some
local baron might pull out a list of absentees
and slap down a paper majority which would
outweigh the presence of concerned citizens
gathered to vote. And wrong that a state committee
as in New York or Pennsylvania, could name a third
of its state's entire delegation and in Illinois
more than half. Again, wrong that a caucus at
ward or precinct level should meet secretly,
without notice, in a basement, parlor, or backroom
clubhouse and claim it spoke for all the
community's Democrats. And again wrong that a
group of men who dominated a community could make
up a slate behind closed doors and offer it to
the voters as their only choice of representat ives
The list of procedural wrongs was thick. .. There
could be, and was little opposition.
^
CRITICISM AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS
The reform program was not without its shortcomings
however
,
as it contained some flaws which raised a storm
of controversy. Far and away the greatest point of
contention was the so-called quota system. The sticky
problem of how to assure adequate representation of
blacks, women, and young people had plagued the reformers
from the beginning of the Commission’s study. Though the
Commission had discouraged the use of quotas, many state
parties eventually turned to this method to insure that
their delegations would not be challenged. Despite this
fact, however, fully three-quarters of the total number
of challenges were based entirely or in part on the anti-
discrimination guidelines. Thus the confusion that did
occur in 1972 was attributed mainly to these provisions,
and they received the brunt of the criticism aimed at
the reform program.
For the first time in the party's history, certain
demographic groups in the population were guaranteed
seats at the national convention on the basis of their
biological status. This is what was objected to the most
—
not just that discrimination or exclusion was prohibited,
but that quotas of inclusion were insisted upon. This was
pointed out in a New York Times article entitled "A
Quota by Any Other Name...’’.
Most changes were long overdue and evoked
little or no opposition, but one— unfortunately
the most important— was vaguely conceived,
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ambiguously drawn up, and loaded with potential
mischief. This time bomb is the reform
guideline to "eliminate all vestiges of
discrimination", which is admirable, by
evoking a concept that is not... From the
historic dream that race, religion, and later
sex, would one day be no bar to any post or
privilege, some have come around to the
concept that they should, on the contrary,
be made specific qualifications for both.
The net result is that the bars have not
been removed at all, but only moved about.
The change in the dream may be a gain for
some in the short run, but it is a loss for
all in the end.
7
Aside from being attacked on the principle of
demographic representation, the anti-discrimination
guidelines were also opposed for their exclusiveness.
Only a certain few groups were specifically quaranteed
representation while others were ignored. Though persons
betv/een 18 and 30 were promised representation in proportion
to their numbers in the population, no such assurances
were given to persons over 65— another age group with
distinctive interests that has been underrepresented
at national conventions. Moreover, though discrimination
was prohibited against racial minorities, no mention was
made of religious or ethnic minorities. Many felt that it
was not fair to invoke a quota system in behalf of certain
elements of the population and not for others. By the
same reasoning they knew that mandatory quotas were
unworkable, particularly if carried to their logical
extreme
—
quaranteed representation for all minorities.
This was brought out in an article by Mary Meehan in
The Nation:
The minority guidelines protected only
some minorities. Poor people for example, were
not included. White ethnics also lacked
special protection. A literal reading of the
minority guideline seems to include religious
and ethnic minorities; but as it was interpreted
in 1972 it included only racial minorities.
It will have its real test when white ethnics
start organizing. Democrats will be so busy
calculating quotas for Italians, Czechs, Croats,
Ukrainians, Slovenes, Greeks, Irish— and maybe
oven WASPS— that issues may be forgotten
entirely ... The quota system may become a parody
of itself and finally fall of its own weight.
8
The quota system was made to look only slightly less
ridiculous by Mike Royko of the Chicago Sun-Times in an
open letter to the slate of delegates which eventually
replaced Mayor Daley’s slate at the convention. Though
it had the required number of blacks, women, and young
persons, Royko chided it for its failure to represent
Chicago's large groups of white ethnics;
I just don't see where your delegation
is representative of Chicago's Democrats.
And that is what this thing is all about...
About a third of your delegates are black.
Many of them are young people. You even have
a fewT Lat in-Americans . But as I looked over the
names of your delegates I saw something
pecul iar ... There ' s only one Italian there. Are
you saying that only one out of every 59 votes
cast in a Chicago election is cast by an Italian?
And only three of your 59 have Polish names...
Your reforms have disenfranchised Chicago's
v^hite ethnic Democrats, which is a strange
reform.
9
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Obviously then, the guidelines on discrimination
went awry. By insisting on inclusion of only
certain demographic groups they in a sense perverted
the very spirit of democracy and participation which
they had sought to foster. The motive was noble and
just; the method was seriously lacking. During the
delegate selection process voices of protest had been
raised against the quotas, but they were the officially
sanctioned rules of the party and had to be complied with.
Those who tried to circumvent the rules found a tough
Credentials Committee intent on upholding the guidelines.
After the credentials fights, however, it became apparent
that some adjustment in the anti—discrimination
guidelines was necessary, for the party could not
continue to have 40 cJo of its delegates challenged at
future conventions. One suggested change follows:
The use of quotas is inherently restrictive
and emphasizes demographic considerations at
the expense of such reasonable criteria as
merit and experience. In addition, quotas
raise the specter of an infinite regression of
representation of every conceivable group that
has developed political consciousness. Clearly
the line must be drawn somewhere ... Exact
descriptive representation of every group is
neither possible nor desirable. Reasonable
representation of salient groups is a more
appropriate cri terion
. .
. I t is not an easy
task to carry out; but it is necessary if
delegate selection is to be fair and democrat ic . 10
1^6
The quota system was a great shock to the
Democratic party’s delegate selection process. It had
ridden roughshod over established norms and procedures,
stepping on some powerful toes as it passed. It was
caught up in a storm of controversy and buffeted from
all sides; its demise was imminent. Though it is not
within the purview of this paper to trace the reform
program beyond 1972, I feel obligated to note that
in October of 1973 the renovated Commission on Party
Structure and Delegate Selection scrapped the old
quota guidelines and inserted in their place language
calling for "affirmative action’' to "encourage" minority
groups to participate in delegate selection. Furthermore,
the Commission added that this "shall not be accomplished
either directly or indirectly by the party's imposition
of mandatory quotas at any level of the delegate
selection process. This move was aimed at banning
quotas while at the same time reaffirming the party's
commitment to anti-discrimination and participation
for all.
This reworking of the guidelines brings us to
the question of the reform program's timing. A major
criticism of the program was that it attempted to
change "too much, too fast". To many party stalwarts
who had witnessed the same stale procedures year in
and year out for decades, the reform program appeared to
m
be a revolutionary wave sweeping all before it. They
looked with horror upon the establishment of quotas
and upon the abolition of the unit rule, proxy voting,
and ex officio delegates. They argued that the party
was plunging headlong into a protracted period of
confusion and instability due to the acceptance of
these untried procedures. Their predictions were in
part realized by the confusion and frustration caused
by the quota system. It must be realized, however, that
every new venture cannot attain 100% efficiency
immediately. There are bound to be mistakes— errors,
oversights, omissions, mistaken judgements. These are
to be expected, especially when dealing with as large
and complex a problem as national convention delegate
selection. All things considered, the 1972 reforms were
not an overreaction on the part of the reformers. They
were the first quantum leap forward in decades; they
had to be so in order to shake the system out of its
former state of lethargy and stagnation. After this
initial injection of reform, then, the party was in a
better position to take some time, settle back and
reexamine the reform process from a cooler and more
objective viewpoint, with an eye to amending, polishing,
and refining. The following editorial by The New York
Times seems to put the reform cycle in the proper
context
:
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In theory, the reforms could have been
introduced gradually, over a period of two or
three conventions, thus giving the party
more time to adapt. But historically, radical
change seems to follow a rhythm of its own.
Denied for a long time, it suddenly gathers
force with startling haste. The turmoil through
which the Democrats are now passing may seem
wasteful and disorderly, and in some respects
it is. But this turmoil also marks the release
of new energies and the arrival of new strengths...
Tightly run political parties can be decorous
and orderly. But so are cemeteries . 12
Another criticism of the reforms was that the ban on
the unit rule and the move toAvard proportional
representation A^ould destroy state delegations*
solidarity, thus further fracturing and fragmenting the
main units promoting unity at the convention. The
basic conflict was betAvecn the reformers' impetus
toivard fairness, minority rights, and adequate candidate
representation, and the more traditional objectives of
efficiency, majority rule, and unity as a means to
victory. The center of controversy on this point Avas
the guideline which required that delegates be allocated
on the basis of proportional representation at all levels
of the selection process in convention states. The
problem Avas further exacerbated by the great winner take
all primary battle of 1972 centering on California. In
order to prevent further credentials challenges to such
primaries in the future, and to bring primary states into
line Avith the spirit of reform, the 1972 Convention
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mandated the abolition of all winner take all primaries
by 1976.
This prompted many to ask whether the reforms
have gone too far with the idea of proportional
representation, even to the point of bringing about
consequences which they were intended to abolish. The
further expansion of proportional representation,
for example, will substantially weaken the front
runner's position, will encourage and even reward
minority or splinter candidates, and will make a first
ballot nomination less likely. This could mean the
resurgence of brokered conventions, particularly if
a candidate such as George Wallace manages to acquire
a sizeable bloc of a few hundred delegates with which
to bargain. Some observers, such as columnist David
Broder, have even suggested that if the left and center
are sufficiently split, Wallace might sweep the primaries
and state conventions and become the front runner himself.
Thus the reforms are succeeding in bringing fairer and
more democratic procedures to the party, but are doing
so at the expense of party unity and control. Judith
Parris addressed herself to this issue in her book,
The Convention Problem:
It may be difficult to reconcile fairness
to every faction with the rapid choice of a
nominee and the rallying of a broad party
consensus. And a party that bares its internal
struggles to public scrutiny may find it
difficult to win elections. The new thrust is
toward diversity, while the old impulse was
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toward unity. As a result, the modifications
in conventions required by the new values
suggest far more extensive change than mere
tinkering with the formal structure would
seem to imply. 13
Thus the reforms conflicted with one of the
convention’s oldest and most important functions:
unity as a means to victory. As the presidential
nominee, Senator McGovern learned much to his chagrin
that intraparty wounds heal slowly. It would be totally
unfair to blame the Senator’s defeat in November on
the reform guidelines. However, inasmuch as they
helped divide and fac t ional ize the Democratic party
and alienate certain of its traditionally strong
supporters, they were a contributing factor in the
November landslide. It is for this reason that many
of the party regulars fear and oppose the exact
representation of all minority viewpoints.
FINAL ASSESSMENT
The abuses present
party's left wring; some
1972 worked against the
anyone’s guess what may
third set of delegate s
in 1968 worked
of the reforms
right wing and
happen in 1976
election rules.
against the
in effect in
center; it is
under yet a
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In the overview then, after hearing its praises
sung and its defects condemned, what can we conclude
about the reform program? Its main feature is that
although it contained some serious flaws, it was a
great improvement over the decaying procedures of the
past. So much attention was directed at the failure
of the quota system that few people noticed how well
the great majority of the guidelines worked in bringing
about needed changes. Some guidelines need improvement
and they will be improved— not just for 1976, but for
the next convention, and the one after that. But solid
progress has been made: the Democrats have now discarded
the policy of accepting the same stagnant procedures
unquest ioningly from year to year. The reforms of
1969-1972 were a much needed shock which rudely
awakened the party and pushed it forward.
One of the greatest effects of the guidelines
may be yet to come, though there have already been
manifestations of it. The reforms will undoubtedly
have an effect on the Republican party. In 1972
the Republican National Committee was under attack
from the Ripon Society and numerous women* s and
civil rights' groups for its unrepresentative
apportionment of delegates. In the Massachusetts
G.O.P. at large slate, an effort at conciliation of
the women's protest was made when Lieutenant-Governor
1 '*
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Donald Dwight and House Republican Leader Francis
Hatch resigned their seats to make room for two
additional female delegates. Originally only one of
the ten at large slots had been allocated to a woman.
The 1972 Republican Convention then debated, but
defeated, reforms in the allocation formula for 1976.
Since then, Republican reformers have been active in
the party and in the courts to get some sort of reform
procedures underway by 1976. Faced with the successful
1
precedent of the Democratic party, the Republicans
can not keep the lid on reform for much longer.
The Democratic experience may yet alter the faces of
both major political parties. As Nation magazine
editorialized of the reforms:
On many counts this must rank as the
most significant convention in the party’s
history ... The Democratic party will never
be the same; that it has changed for the
better few can doubt. And the renovation
still in progress will sooner or later force
the Republican party to initiate many of
the same reforms. 1 5
; t : Thus the effects of the reform effort are
strikingly apparent. Despite their flaws, the guidelines
succeeded in their primary goal of opening up the
delegate selection procedure to more rank and file party
members than ever before by lifting many of the
restrictive practices formerly employed by party
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bosses and machines. Next, they made it possible for
a record number of hitherto excluded minority groups
to find their way into the convention process. They
also allowed voters to express their presidential
preferences as never before, and permitted all
candidates to receive a fairer degree of representation.
Finally, they established a precedent for the Republican
party, a party which contains many of the same
procedural weaknesses which afflicted the Democrats
in 1968.
These results make it amply clear that the
Democratic party's effort to amend and purify its
delegate selection procedures must rank as the most
successful attempt at reinvigorating the national
conventions to date. It was a mammoth effort to make
the conventions more reflective of the party members
and more responsive to their wishes. The guidelines of
the Commission on Tarty Structure and Delegate Selection
have undoubtedly made delegate selection more open,
equitable, and democratic. Born in the ashes of
Chicago, they brought in their maturity a breath of
fresh air to national convention politics and hope
for an even brighter future. They have gone a long way
toward bringing our political system closer to that
ideal envisioned by Lincoln— a government of the
people, by the people, and for the people.
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